Meet-in-the-middle Attack on RAIN-128
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摘要: RAIN是一族SPN结构的轻量级分组密码算法，该算法具有软硬件实现效率高、安全性强等特点。中间相遇攻击被广泛应用于分组密码算法的安全性分析中。该文通过分析RAIN-128的结构特性和截断差分特征，利用差分枚举技术分别构造了4轮和6轮中间相遇区分器，给出了8轮及10轮的中间相遇攻击。当攻击轮数为8轮时，预计算阶段的时间复杂度为$ {2^{68}} $次8轮RAIN-128加密，存储复杂度为$ {2^{75}} $ bit，在线攻击阶段的时间复杂度为$ {2^{109}} $次8轮加密，数据复杂度是$ {2^{72}} $个选择明文；当攻击轮数为10轮时，预计算阶段的时间复杂度为$ {2^{214}} $次10轮加密，存储复杂度为$ {2^{219}} $ bit，在线攻击阶段的时间复杂度为$ {2^{109}} $次10轮加密，数据复杂度是$ {2^{72}} $个选择明文，分析结果显示，RAIN-128可以抵抗中间相遇攻击，并具有较高的安全冗余。Abstract: RAIN is a lightweight block cipher with SPN structure, which not only has strong security, but also possesses high software and hardware implementation efficiency. Meet-in-the-middle attacks are widely used in the security analysis of block ciphers algorithms. In this paper, the meet-in-the-middle attack on RAIN is researched. By examining the structural characteristics and the properties of truncated differential of RAIN-128, both 4-round and 6-round meet-in-the-middle distinguishers are first constructed by using differential enumeration technique, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 8-round and 10-round RAIN-128 are presented, respectively. For 8-round attack, in the preprocessing, the time complexity is $ {2^{68}} $ 8-round encryptions, and the memory complexity is $ {2^{75}} $ bit, in the online, the time complexity is $ {2^{109}} $ 8-round encryptions, and the data complexity is $ {2^{72}} $ chosen plaintexts. For 10-round attack, in the preprocessing, the time complexity is $ {2^{214}} $ 10-round encryptions, and the memory complexity is $ {2^{219}} $ bit, in the online, the time complexity is $ {2^{109}} $ 10-round encryptions, and the data complexity is $ {2^{72}} $ chosen plaintexts. The result shows that RAIN-128 can be against meet-in-the-middle attack and has high security redundancy.
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Key words:
- Block ciphers /
- RAIN-128 /
- Meet-in-the-middle attack /
- Differential enumeration technique
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表 1 RAIN算法的8/10轮中间相遇攻击复杂度
轮数(r) 时间(预计算) 时间(在线) 数据 存储(bit) 8 $ {2^{68}} $ $ {2^{109}} $ $ {2^{72}} $ $ {2^{75}} $ 10 $ {2^{214}} $ $ {2^{109}} $ $ {2^{72}} $ $ {2^{219}} $ 
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