Network Defense Decision-making Method Based on Improved Evolutionary Game Model
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摘要: 针对网络防御决策的误差干扰和实时响应问题，该文提出一种改进演化博弈模型(IEGM)和网络防御决策方法。首先，借鉴经典伺服系统模型，用微分假设量化表示防御方对攻击策略的短期预测效应，加快模型收敛速度，提升防御决策效率。其次，分析攻防博弈中的误差产生机理，量化定义网络防御中的观测误差，提出改进复制动力学方程，加强模型对信息偏差的容忍度。在此基础上，建立改进演化博弈模型，证明了模型能够收敛至纳什均衡解的微小
$ \varepsilon $ -邻域，给出了相应的稳定性分析，并设计了一种网络防御决策方法。理论分析和仿真结果表明，所提模型能够克服观测误差影响，给出偏差数量级在0.01%的最优防御纯策略，且在强干扰环境下，防御决策的响应速度相较于其他3种经典决策模型最高可以提升64.06%。改进模型和防御决策方法能够有效提升防御决策的响应时效性和对观测误差的适应性。Abstract: For the problem that the existing network defense decision-making method is challenging by error interference and real-time response, a novel network defense decision-making method based on an Improved Evolutionary Game Model (IEGM) is proposed. Firstly, using the classical servo system model for reference, the short-term prediction effect of the defense side on the attack strategy is quantified by differential hypothesis to accelerate the convergence of the model and improve the efficiency of defense decisions. Secondly, the mechanism of error generation in attack-defense game is analyzed, then the observational error in network defense is defined quantitatively, and the improved replication dynamics equation is proposed to strengthen the tolerance of the model to information deviation. On this basis, an improved evolutionary game model is established, and the corresponding stability analysis and mathematical proof are given to prove that the model can converge to the$ \varepsilon $ -neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium solution. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed model can overcome the influence of observation error, and the optimal pure defense strategy with deviation order of 0.01% is given. Besides, under the jamming environment, the response speed of defense decision-making can be improved by 64.06% compared with the other three decision models. The improved model and decision-making method can effectively improve the response timeliness of defense decisions and the adaptability to observation error. -
表 1 原子攻击策略
序号 原子攻击动作名称 所利用漏洞编号 感染概率$ \lambda $ 攻击成本$ {A_{{\text{cost}}}} $ $ {a_1} $ Web资源管理
漏洞攻击CNNVD-202104-989 0.78 0.20 $ {a_2} $ Oracle数据库
输入验证攻击CNNVD-202107-1424 0.89 0.15 $ {a_3} $ Word插件路径
遍历攻击CNNVD-202109-701 0.93 0.10 $ {a_4} $ Microsoft Edge
跨站脚本攻击CNNVD-202109-106 0.73 0.25 
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表 2 原子防御策略
序号 原子防御动作名称 防御动作描述 操作代价$ {D_{{\text{cost}}}} $ 防御效果$ \phi $ b1 设置黑洞路由 利用防火墙修改路由表到不可达IP 0.30 0.59 b2 丢弃可疑数据包 利用IDS进行包过滤 0.10 0.25 b3 限制用户活动 限制可疑用户的权限及活动 0.50 0.83 b4 格式化硬盘 格式化硬盘去除所有恶意代码 0.80 0.99
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算法1 最优防御纯策略选取算法 输入：国家信息安全漏洞库CNNVD
输出：最优防御纯策略集合优防御纯策略集合$S_{\rm{D}} $(Best)
BEGIN
(1) /* 初始化改进演化博弈模型 */
Initialize IEGM=$(N,S,P,{P}'_{\text{A} } ,U,\epsilon ,\dot{P})$；
{
(a) Construct $ N = ({N_{\text{A}}},{N_{\text{D}}}) $；
/* 构建网络攻防异质群体博弈参与者空间 */
(b) Construct $ S = ({S_{\text{A}}},{S_{\text{D}}}) $;
/* 根据表1、表2构建混合策略空间 */
(c) Construct $ P = ({P_{\text{A}}},{P_{\text{D}}}) $；
/* 创建待赋值的实际博弈信念空间 */
(d) Construct ${P'_{\text{A} } } = ({P'_{ {\text{A1} } } } ,{P'_{ {\text{A2} } } } , \cdots ,{P'_{ {\text{A} }j} } )$；
/* 根据历史数据构建攻击方经验博弈信念空间 */
(e) Construct $ U = ({U_{\text{A}}},{U_{\text{D}}}) $；
/* 创建待赋值的博弈收益空间 */
(f) Assign $ e(t) \in [ - 1,1] $；
/* 为观测误差赋值随机数 */
(g) Construct $\dot{P}=(\dot{ {P}_{\text{A} } },\dot{ {P}_{\text{D} } })$；
/* 创建待赋值的短期预测集合 */
}
(2) /* 计算攻防博弈收益 */
For $ (n = 1;n \le i;n + + ) $
For $ (m = 1;m \le j;m + + ) $
{
Calculate $\left\{\begin{array}{l}{U}_{{\rm{D}}}=\varphi \text{ }·\text{ }{V}_{\text{r} }-{D}_{\text{cost} }\\ {U}_{{\rm{A}}}=\lambda \text{ }·\text{ }{V}_{\text{r} }-{A}_{\text{cost} }{D}_{\mathrm{cos}t}\end{array} \right.$;${\bf{Calculate} }\left\{\begin{array}{l}{\overline{U} }_{\text{D} }={\displaystyle {\sum }_{n=1}^{i}{P}_{\text{D}n}\cdot {U}_{\text{D}n}\text{ } },\;\text{ }1\le n\le i\\ {\overline{U} }_{\text{A} }={\displaystyle {\sum }_{m=1}^{j}{P}_{\text{A}m}\cdot {U}_{\text{A}m}\text{ } },\text{ }1\le m\le j\end{array} \right.$；
}
(3) /* 构建改进复制动态方程 */
For $ (n = 1;n \le i;n + + ) $
For $ (m = 1;m \le j;m + + ) $
{
Construct ${ \dot{P}_{\text{D}i} }=\beta ({P}_{\text{A}j}(t)+e(t)+ {\dot {P}_{\text{A}j}(t)})-{\displaystyle {\sum }_{n=1}^{i}{P}_{\text{D}n}\text{(}t\text{) }·\text{ }{U}_{\text{D}n}(t)\text{ } }$；
}
(4) /* 模型求解 */
Define function
/* 定义微分方程求解函数 */
function =
@(t)[${ \dot{P}_{\text{D}i} }=\beta ({P}_{\text{A}j}(t)+ {\dot {P}_{\text{A}j}(t)+e}(t))-{\displaystyle {\sum }_{n=1}^{i}{P}_{\text{D}n}\text{(}t\text{) }·\text{ }{U}_{\text{D}n}(t)\text{ } }$];
Assign t;
/* 为计算时长T赋值 */
For $ (n = 1;n \le i;n + + ) $
{
ode45(function, T, $ P $);
/* 利用MATLAB ode45函数对方程进行求解 */
When $ {P_{{\text{D}}i}} = 1 $
Return $ {S_{\text{D}}}({\text{Best}}) $;
/* 当防御方博弈信念为1时输出最优防御纯策略 */
Else
Return 0;
}
END
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表 3 实验3参数设置
模型 $ {u_1} $ $ {u_2} $ $ {P_{{\text{A1}}}} $ $ {P_{{\text{D1}}}} $ 其他参数 IEGM 0.22 0.26 0.6 0.4 $ \left| {e(t)} \right| = (0,\delta ] $ ADEGM 0.22 0.26 0.6 0.4 – NADG 0.22 0.26 0.6 0.4 – IADEGM 0.22 0.26 0.6 0.4 $ {\lambda _{21}} = 1 $
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表 4 实验3中模型收敛至最优解所需演化代数
模型 $ \left| {e(t)} \right| \le 1 $ $ \left| {e(t)} \right| \le 0.1 $ $ \left| {e(t)} \right| \le 0.01 $ IEGM 67 94 91 ADEGM 82 104 115 NADG 99 133 94 IADEGM 110 98 117
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