Modeling of Network Attack and Defense Behavior and Analysis of Situation Evolution Based on Game Theory
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摘要: 网络安全本质在对抗。针对现有研究缺乏从博弈视角分析网络攻防行为与态势演化关系的问题,该文提出一种网络攻防博弈架构模型(NADGM),借鉴传染病动力学理论以不同安全状态网络节点密度定义网络攻防态势,分析网络节点安全状态转移路径;以网络勒索病毒攻防博弈为例,使用NetLogo多Agent仿真工具开展不同场景下攻防态势演化趋势对比实验,得出增强网络防御效能的结论。实验结果验证了模型方法的有效性和可行性。Abstract: The essence of network security is confrontation. In view of at the problem that the existing research lacks to analyze the relationship between network attack and defense behavior and situation evolution from the perspective of game, a Network Attack And Defense Game architecture Model (NADGM) is proposed, the theory of infectious disease dynamics is used to define the network attack and defense situation with the density of network nodes in different security states, and the network node security state transition path is analyzed; The network blackmail virus attack and defense game is taken as an example, and NetLogo multi-agent simulation tools is used to carry out comparative experiments of attack and defense situation evolution trend in different scenarios, and the conclusion of enhancing network defense effectiveness is obtained. The experimental results verify the effectiveness and feasibility of the model method.
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表 1 勒索病毒攻防类型及策略划分
攻防类型 攻防策略 策略含义 ${\varTheta _{ {\rm{DH} } } }$ D1 安全意识强,及时升级系统和病毒库等 D2 安全意识强,及时修补漏洞等 ${\varTheta _{ {\rm{DL} } } }$ D3 安全意识弱,延迟升级系统和病毒库等 D4 安全意识弱,延迟修补漏洞等 ${\varTheta _{ {\rm{AH} } } }$ A1 攻击能力强,熟练运用漏洞扫描攻击等 A2 攻击能力强,熟练运用社会工程学攻击等 ${\varTheta _{ {\rm{AL} } } }$ A3 攻击能力弱,勉强运用漏洞扫描攻击等 A4 攻击能力弱,勉强运用社会工程学攻击等 表 2 不同策略组合下攻防收益
防御策略 攻击策略 A1 A2 A3 A4 D1 (530,800) (550,780) (800,360) (820,330) D2 (410,910) (420,890) (780,380) (800,350) D3 (120,1580) (130,1560) (240,770) (260,740) D4 (100,1820) (110,1940) (210,810) (220,780) -
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