Random Addition-chain Based Countermeasure Against Side-channel Attack for Advanced Encryption Standard
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摘要:
侧信道攻击已经对高级加密标准(AES)的硬件安全造成严重威胁,如何抵御侧信道攻击成为目前亟待解决的问题。字节替换操作作为AES算法中唯一的非线性操作,提高其安全性对整个加密算法有重要意义。该文提出一种基于随机加法链的AES抗侧信道攻击对策,该对策用随机加法链代替之前固定的加法链来实现有限域GF(28)上的乘法求逆操作,在此基础上研究随机加法链对算法安全性和有效性方面的影响。实验表明,所提随机加法链算法比之前固定的加法链算法在抵御侧信道攻击上更加安全、有效。
Abstract:Side channel attacks have serious threat to the hardware security of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), how to resist the side channel attack becomes an urgent problem. Byte substitution operation is the only nonlinear operation in AES algorithm, so it is very important for the whole encryption algorithm to improve its security. In this paper, a countermeasure against side-channel attack is proposed based on random addition-chain for AES by replacing the fixed addition-chain with random addition-chain to realize the inverse operation of multiplication in a finite field GF(28). The impact of the random addition-chain on the security and effectiveness of the algorithm is studied. Experimental results show that the proposed random addition-chain based algorithm is more secure and effective than the previous fixed addition-chain based algorithms in defending against side channel attacks.
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表 1 16条不同功耗特性的加法链
序号 加法链路径 (1) 1→2→4→8→16→32→64→80→84→168→252→254 (2) 1→2→4→8→16→32→64→80→84→86→168→254 (3) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→100→200→250→254 (4) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→100→102→204→254 (5) 1→2→4→8→16→32→48→50→54→100→200→254 (6) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→80→84→168→252→254 (7) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→80→84→86→168→254 (8) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→42→84→126→127→254 (9) 1→2→4→8→16→32→40→42→43→84→ 127→254 (10) 1→2→4→8→16→32→36→72→144→216→252→254 (11) 1→2→4→8→16→24→40→50→100→200→250→254 (12) 1→2→4→8→16→24→48→50→100→102→204→254 (13) 1→2→4→8→16→24→48→50→54→100→200→254 (14) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→56→112→224→252→254 (15) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→56→112→113→226→254 (16) 1→2→4→8→16→24→28→30→56→112→224→254 表 2 随机数生成算法
将包含1~16的数组完全打乱 输入:a[16]={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16} 输出:1~16随机排列后的数组 (1)srand((unsigned)time(NULL))/*随机数发生器的初始函数*/ (2)int i,j,temp (3)for i from 16 to 1 do /*i 从16递减到1 */ (4)j=rand()%(i+1) /*生成0~i的随机数*/ (5)Temp=a[j] /*交换数组中第i+1个数和第j+1个数*/ (6)a[j]=a[i] (7)a[i]=temp (8)end for 表 3 不同方案的不同模块的面积比较
方案 组合面积(kGE) 非组合面积(kGE) 网络互连面积(kGE) 总面积(kGE) 字节替换 行移位 列混合 密钥加 密钥扩展 标准AES 1067 32 149 66 1190 854 46 3404 文献[7]方案 2179 32 149 66 2328 675 26 5441 循环调用加法链 2162 32 149 66 2320 675 20 5424 乱序调用加法链 2165 32 149 66 2344 675 21 5452 -
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