高级搜索

留言板

尊敬的读者、作者、审稿人, 关于本刊的投稿、审稿、编辑和出版的任何问题, 您可以本页添加留言。我们将尽快给您答复。谢谢您的支持!

姓名
邮箱
手机号码
标题
留言内容
验证码

自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究

刘浩 陈志刚 张连明

刘浩, 陈志刚, 张连明. 自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究[J]. 电子与信息学报, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
引用本文: 刘浩, 陈志刚, 张连明. 自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究[J]. 电子与信息学报, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
LIU Hao, CHEN Zhigang, ZHANG Lianming. Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
Citation: LIU Hao, CHEN Zhigang, ZHANG Lianming. Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2017, 39(8): 1986-1992. doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335

自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究

doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335
基金项目: 

国家自然科学基金(61572191, 61571188 ),湖南省自然科学基金(2017JJ2124),湖南省教育厅优秀青年科研项目 (15B125),湖南省计算机应用技术重点建设学科资助项目

Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network

Funds: 

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572191, 61571188), The Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (2017JJ2124), The Outstanding Youth Scientific Research Foundation of Department of Education, Hunan Province (15B125), The Key Construction Course of Computer Application Technology in Hunan Province

  • 摘要: 该文针对移动P2P网络中节点表现出来的自私性,并结合移动P2P网络的资源受限、自组织以及开放性等特点,提出一种基于不完全信息的双方叫价拍卖模型的节点激励策略DAIP。该激励策略采用虚拟货币的支付方式,节点根据其拥有的虚拟货币量、自身资源状态和消息属性对每次消息转发进行估价,然后根据估价与博弈策略给出相应报价。通过博弈分析给出了DAIP策略的线性策略贝叶斯纳什均衡解,使各节点为最大化其自身利益而积极参与消息转发合作,从而促进网络系统中消息转发合作的成功。分析与实验结果表明该激励策略能够降低系统的能量消耗,提高整个网络系统的消息转发成功率,提高系统的整体效用。
  • 张国印, 李军. 移动对等网络覆盖网[J]. 软件学报, 2013, 24(1): 139-152. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1001.2013.04332.
    ZHANG G Y and Li J. Overlays in mobile P2P networks[J]. Journal of Software, 2013, 24(1): 139-152. doi: 10.3724/SP.J. 1001.2013.04332.
    COURCOUBETIS C and WEBER R. Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems[J]. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2006, 24(5): 1034-1050.
    曲大鹏, 王兴伟, 黄敏. 移动对等网络中自私节点的检测和激励策略[J]. 软件学报, 2013, 24(4): 887-899. doi: 10.3724/SP. J.1001.2013.04290.
    QU D P, WAND X W, and HUANG M. Selfish node detection and incentive mechanism in mobile P2P networks [J]. Journal of Software, 2013, 24(4): 887-899. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1001.2013.04290.
    SAFIRIYU E and DAUDA A. A novel decurity protocol for P2P incentive schemes[J]. Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science and Technology, 2015, 5(2): 1046-1051.
    FELDMAN M, PAPADIMITRIOU C, and CHUANG J. Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems[J]. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2006, 24(5): 1010-1019.
    乐光学, 李仁发, 陈志, 等. P2P网络中搭便车行为分析与抑制机制建模[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2011, 48(3): 382-397.
    LE X G, LI R F, CHEN Z, et al. Analysis of Free-riding behaviors and modeling restrain mechanisms for peer-to-peer networks[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2011, 48(3): 382-397.
    LI Y Z, GRUENBACHER D, and SCOGLIO C. Reward only is not enough: Evaluating and improving the fairness policy of the P2P file sharing network eMule/eDonkey[J]. Journal of Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, 2012, 5(1): 40-57.
    CHEN H W, XU H, and CHEN L. Incentive mechanisms for P2P network nodes based on repeated game[J]. Journal of Networks, 2012, 7(2): 385-392.
    KANG X and WU Y D. Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous peer-to-peer networks: A stackelberg game approach[J]. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2015, 14(5): 1-13.
    牛新征, 周明天, 佘堃. 一种应用于移动P2P网络的资源协作共享策略[J]. 电子学报, 2010, 38(1): 18-24.
    NIU X Z, ZHOU M T, and SHE K. A cooperative sharing scheme for resources in mobile P2P networks[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2010, 38(1): 18-24.
    TAN G and JARVIS S A. A payment-based incentive and service differentiation scheme for peer-to-peer streaming broadcast[J]. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2008, 19(7): 940-954.
    YANG Y, LIU B, and SHI Y. Design and simulation of the cooperation incentive mechanism in ad hoc network based on evolutionary game[J]. ICIC Express Letters, 2015, 9(10): 2827-2834.
    CHENG G, SONG M, ZHANG Y, et al. Routing protocol based on social characteristics for opportunistic networks[J]. The Journal of China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications, 2014, 21(1): 67-73.
    PADHARIYA N, MONDAL A, MADRIA S K, et al. Economic incentive-based brokerage schemes for improving data availability in mobile-P2P networks[J]. Computer Communications, 2013, 36(2): 861-874.
    DING H and PEI J M. The research of resource auction incentive mechanism in mobile P2P[C]. International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking Mobile Computing, Beijing, China, 2010: 1-3.
    李云, 于季弘, 尤肖虎. 资源受限的机会网络节点激励策略研究[J]. 计算机学报, 2013, 35(5): 947-956. doi: 10.3724/SP.J. 1016.2013.00947.
    LI Y, YU J H, and YOU X H. An incentive protocol for opportunistic networks with resources constraint[J]. Chinese Journal of Computers, 2013, 35(5): 947-956. doi: 10.3724/ SP.J.1016.2013.00947.
    周经亚, 宋爱波, 罗军舟. P2P 网络中一种基于进化博弈的资源配置模型[J]. 软件学报, 2013, 24(3): 526-539. doi: 10.3724/ SP.J.1001.2013.04229.
    ZHOU J Y, SONG A B, and LUO J Z. Evolutionary game theoretical resource deployment model for P2P networks[J]. Journal of Software, 2013, 24(3): 526-539. doi: 10.3724/SP.J. 1001.2013.04229.
    李帮义, 王玉燕. 博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 北京: 科学出版社, 2016: 253-260.
    LI B Y and WANG Y Y. Game Theory and Information Economics[M]. Beijing: China, Science Press, 2016: 253-260.
    TADELIS S. Game Theory: An Introduction[M]. Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2012: 428-432.
  • 加载中
计量
  • 文章访问数:  1051
  • HTML全文浏览量:  146
  • PDF下载量:  268
  • 被引次数: 0
出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2016-12-08
  • 修回日期:  2017-05-19
  • 刊出日期:  2017-08-19

目录

    /

    返回文章
    返回