自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究

刘浩; 陈志刚; 张连明

doi:10.11999/JEIT161335

自私性移动P2P网络中节点激励策略研究

doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335

1.
(湖南人文科技学院信息学院娄底 417000) ②(中南大学信息科学与工程学院长沙 410083) ③(湖南师范大学物理与信息科学学院长沙 410081)

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金(61572191, 61571188 )，湖南省自然科学基金(2017JJ2124)，湖南省教育厅优秀青年科研项目 (15B125)，湖南省计算机应用技术重点建设学科资助项目

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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2016-12-08
- 修回日期: 2017-05-19
- 刊出日期: 2017-08-19

Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network

1.
(Institute of Information, Hunan University of Humanities, Science and Technology, Loudi 417000, China)
2.
(School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

Funds:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572191, 61571188), The Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (2017JJ2124), The Outstanding Youth Scientific Research Foundation of Department of Education, Hunan Province (15B125),　The Key Construction Course of Computer Application Technology in Hunan Province

摘要

摘要: 该文针对移动P2P网络中节点表现出来的自私性，并结合移动P2P网络的资源受限、自组织以及开放性等特点，提出一种基于不完全信息的双方叫价拍卖模型的节点激励策略DAIP。该激励策略采用虚拟货币的支付方式，节点根据其拥有的虚拟货币量、自身资源状态和消息属性对每次消息转发进行估价，然后根据估价与博弈策略给出相应报价。通过博弈分析给出了DAIP策略的线性策略贝叶斯纳什均衡解，使各节点为最大化其自身利益而积极参与消息转发合作，从而促进网络系统中消息转发合作的成功。分析与实验结果表明该激励策略能够降低系统的能量消耗，提高整个网络系统的消息转发成功率，提高系统的整体效用。
- 移动P2P网络 /
- 自私性 /
- 拍卖模型 /
- 虚拟货币 /
- 激励策略
Abstract: In view of the selfishness of nodes in mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, combined with its features of the resource-constrained, self-organization and opening, this paper proposes a novel Incentive Protocol DAIP of mobile P2P network based on Double Auction model of incomplete information on both sides. The incentive mechanism adopts virtual currency payment method. The node calculates the evaluation of a message forwarding based on the virtual currency, resource state of it and the property of message, then gives the corresponding price according to the evaluation and game strategy. Through the game analysis, the linear strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of DAIP strategy is given, which makes each node to maximize its own benefits, encourages them to cooperate with the message forwarding, and then improves the success rate of message forwarding in the network system. Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively reduce the system's energy consumption, improve the success rate of message forwarding in the whole network system, and improve the overall effectiveness of the system.
- Mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network /
- Selfishness /
- Auction model /
- Virtual currency /
- Incentive protocol

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