低轨卫星网络安全问题及防御技术综述

杜星葵; 束妮娜; 刘春生; 杨方; 马涛; 刘洋

doi:10.11999/JEIT240957

低轨卫星网络安全问题及防御技术综述

doi: 10.11999/JEIT240957

杜星葵¹,
束妮娜¹,
刘春生^{1, 2, ,},
杨方¹,
马涛¹,
刘洋³

1.
国防科技大学电子对抗学院合肥 230037
2.
合肥综合性国家科学中心人工智能研究院合肥 230037
3.
北京市遥感信息研究所北京 100011

基金项目: 高层次人才基金(22-TDRCJH-02-013, 2024-JCJQ-QT-039)

详细信息

作者简介:
杜星葵：男，硕士生，研究方向为低轨卫星网络等

束妮娜：女，教授，研究方向为无线网络优化、卫星互联网安全等

刘春生：男，博士，副教授，研究方向为网络优化、数据补全等

杨方：男，博士生，研究方向为网络空间建模仿真与性能评估等

马涛：男，博士，教授，研究方向为卫星互联网安全与辅助决策等

刘洋：男，博士，工程师，研究方向为空间信息处理、电磁信号智能识别

通讯作者:
刘春生　liuchunsheng17a@nudt.edu.cn

中图分类号: TN927.23; TP393.081
计量
- 文章访问数: 101
- HTML全文浏览量: 75
- PDF下载量: 31
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2024-10-28
- 修回日期: 2025-04-17
- 网络出版日期: 2025-05-21

Overview of Security Issues and Defense Technologies for Low Earth Orbit Satellite Network

DU Xingkui¹,
SHU Nina¹,
LIU Chunsheng^{1, 2
, ,},
YANG Fang¹,
MA Tao¹,
LIU Yang³

1.
College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Hefei 230037, China
2.
Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Hefei Comprehensive National Science Center, Hefei 230037, China
3.
Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Information, Beijing 100011, China

Funds: The High-level Talent Fund (22-TDRCJH-02-013, 2024-JCJQ-QT-039)

摘要

摘要: 随着低轨卫星网络的快速发展，其应用领域日益广泛，与人工智能等技术融合程度日益趋深，但随之而来的安全问题也更加凸显。该文旨在综述低轨卫星网络面临的主要安全问题，并探讨相应的防御技术。该文首先概述低轨卫星网络的发展情况，不同于现有综述侧重于物理层安全的现状，该文针对低轨卫星网络安全问题，特别是网络层安全进行了系统性研究。该文详细介绍了低轨卫星网络的体系架构、独有的网络特征和脆弱性，并分析了其脆弱性机理，系统地介绍了低轨卫星网络面临的不同威胁手段的安全问题。在此基础上，对基于虚拟仿真、人工智能等先进技术的防御技术进行研究与分析，并对未来低轨卫星网络的安全发展方向提出了建议。
- 低轨卫星网络 /
- 网络安全 /
- 防御策略 /
- 人工智能
Abstract: Significance In recent years, Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite networks have experienced rapid development, demonstrating broad application prospects in mobile communications, the Internet of Things (IoT), maritime operations, and other domains. These networks are poised to become a critical component of next-generation network architectures. Currently, leading global and domestic commercial entities are actively deploying mega-constellations to enable worldwide mobile communication and broadband internet services. However, as the scale of LEO constellations expands, the satellite networks are increasingly exposed to both anthropogenic threats (e.g., cyberattacks) and environmental hazards (e.g., space debris). Existing review studies have systematically summarized research on security threats and defense mechanisms across the physical, network, and application layers of LEO satellite networks. Nevertheless, gaps remain in prior literature: First, lack of technical granularity. Many studies provide taxonomies of security issues but fail to focus sufficiently on domain-specific cybersecurity challenges or delve into technical details. Second, overemphasis on integrated space-terrestrial networks. Existing reviews often prioritize the broader context of space-air-ground-sea integrated networks, obscuring the unique vulnerabilities inherent to LEO satellite architectures. Third, imbalanced layer-specific analysis: Current works predominantly address physical and link-layer security, while insufficiently highlighting the distinct characteristics of network-layer threats. Building upon prior research, this paper presents a comprehensive review of security challenges and defense technologies in LEO satellite networks. By analyzing the inherent vulnerabilities of these systems, we provide an in-depth exploration of security threats, particularly those targeting network-layer integrity. Furthermore, we critically evaluate cutting-edge defense mechanisms developed to mitigate realistic threats, offering insights into their technical principles and implementation challenges. Progress This paper first elaborates on the architecture of LEO satellite networks, systematically analyzing the composition and functional roles of three core components: the space segment, ground segment, and user segment. It then summarizes the operational characteristics of LEO networks, including their dynamic multi-layer topology, globally ubiquitous coverage, low-latency data transmission, and resilient resource allocation mechanisms. These intrinsic characteristics fundamentally enable LEO networks to deliver high-quality communication services. Subsequently, this study identifies potential vulnerabilities across four dimensions: nodes, links, protocols, and infrastructure. Due to the open nature of satellite links, transmitted data are susceptible to eavesdropping, where adversaries may intercept satellite signals, predict orbital dynamics, and deploy surveillance systems preemptively. Prior research has addressed satellite communication security through physical-layer security designs and scenario-specific eavesdropping analyses. Through theoretical modeling and case studies, this work categorizes multiple Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack variants and explores routing attack risks inherent to the open architecture of LEO networks. Furthermore, it classifies electronic countermeasure interference types based on target scenarios and adversarial objectives. To counter these threats, the paper evaluates emerging defense technologies, including encryption-based security frameworks, resilient routing protocols, and digital twin-enabled virtualization platforms for network simulation and secure design optimization. Finally, it highlights cutting-edge AI-driven security solutions, such as machine learning-powered anomaly detection and federated learning for distributed threat intelligence. Conclusions This review critically examines the evolution of LEO satellite networks, identifying critical gaps in systematic analysis and comprehensive threat coverage within existing studies. By establishing a four-dimensional vulnerability framework—node vulnerabilities arising from harsh space environmental conditions, link vulnerabilities exacerbated by high orbital dynamics, protocol vulnerabilities stemming from commercial standardization compromises, and infrastructure vulnerabilities due to tight coupling with terrestrial internet systems—the study systematically classifies security threats across physical, network, and application layers. The paper further dissects attack methodologies unique to each threat category and evaluates advanced countermeasures. Notable innovations include quantum cryptography-enhanced encryption systems, fault-tolerant routing algorithms, virtualized network emulation environments, and AI-empowered security paradigms leveraging deep learning and federated learning architectures. These technologies not only significantly enhance the security posture of LEO networks but also demonstrate transformative potential for future adaptive security frameworks. However, challenges persist in balancing computational overhead with real-time operational constraints, necessitating further research into lightweight cryptographic primitives and cross-domain collaborative defense mechanisms. This synthesis provides a foundational reference for advancing next-generation satellite network security while underscoring the imperative for interdisciplinary innovation in space-terrestrial converged systems. Prospects Looking ahead, research on the security of LEO satellite networks will constitute a long-term and complex process. With the integration of emerging technologies such as quantum communication and artificial intelligence, security defense mechanisms in LEO satellite networks will evolve toward greater intelligence and automation. Emerging technologies are anticipated to play increasingly critical roles in this domain, particularly through advancements in adaptive intelligent networking technologies and intelligent networking protocol architectures. These developments will support the efficient convergence of space-air-ground-sea integrated networks. The application of deep learning methodologies to analyze network characteristics and construct corresponding neural network models will further enhance network adaptability and coordination. Concurrently, as commercial deployment of LEO satellite networks accelerates, the critical challenge of balancing security requirements with economic efficiency warrants in-depth investigation. Future research should prioritize cost-benefit analyses and explore optimal trade-offs between cybersecurity and service efficiency across diverse application scenarios. Furthermore, international collaboration is expected to assume a pivotal role in the security governance of LEO satellite networks, particularly through jointly establishing international standards and regulatory frameworks to address transnational security threats. This multilateral approach will be essential for maintaining the integrity and resilience of next-generation satellite infrastructures in an increasingly interconnected orbital environment.
- Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite networks /
- Network security /
- Defensive strategies /
- Artificial Intelligence (AI)

HTML全文

图 1 低轨卫星网络体系架构

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图 2 “星链”网络单个壳层对地面的覆盖情况

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图 3 低轨卫星网络窃听场景

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图 4 卫星网络多用户多窃听者场景

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图 5 低轨卫星网络DDoS攻击场景

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表 1 低轨卫星网络安全问题总结

安全问题	具体手段	威胁描述	威胁影响
窃听攻击	窃听链路	窃听并破解传输的信息	数据泄露
拒绝服务攻击	链路阻塞	分布式恶意流量作用于目标链路	阻塞链路，增大时延
	节点失效	恶意流量占据节点服务	增大时延
	能量消耗	恶意流量消耗节点资源	降低可用性
路由攻击	伪造更新	引导进入攻击者控制的节点或网络路径	信息准确性
	篡改协议	篡改路由协议的控制消息或者数据包	改变路径，增大时延
	路由劫持	在控制的路径窃取或丢弃数据	数据泄露、降低可用性
电子对抗干扰	对卫星干扰	地面或空间设备对卫星进行干扰	降低可用性
电子对抗干扰	对终端干扰	地面或空间设备对用户终端进行干扰	降低可用性

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