隐私保护密文检索技术研究进展

迟佳琳; 冯登国; 张敏; 姜皞昊; 吴阿新; 孙天齐

doi:10.11999/JEIT231300

隐私保护密文检索技术研究进展

doi: 10.11999/JEIT231300

迟佳琳¹,
冯登国^{1, 2, 3},
张敏^1, ,,
姜皞昊^{1, 2},
吴阿新³,
孙天齐^{1, 2}

1.
中国科学院软件研究所北京 100190
2.
中国科学院大学北京 100049
3.
密码科学技术全国重点实验室北京 100878

基金项目: 国家重点研发计划(2022YFB4501500, 2022YFB4501503)

详细信息

作者简介:
迟佳琳：女，博士，助理研究员，研究方向为可搜索加密

冯登国：男，中国科学院院士，研究员，研究方向为网络与信息安全

张敏：女，博士，研究员，研究方向为数据安全与隐私保护

姜皞昊：男，博士生，研究方向为同态加密技术

吴阿新：男，博士后，研究方向为访问控制与可搜索加密

孙天齐：男，博士生，研究方向为可搜索加密

通讯作者:
张敏　zhangmin@iscas.ac.cn

中图分类号: TN918; TP393
计量
- 文章访问数: 616
- HTML全文浏览量: 336
- PDF下载量: 145
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2023-11-24
- 修回日期: 2024-05-07
- 网络出版日期: 2024-05-15
- 刊出日期: 2024-05-30

Advances in Privacy-Preserving Ciphertext Retrieval

CHI Jialin¹,
FENG Dengguo^{1, 2, 3},
ZHANG Min^{1
, ,},
JIANG Haohao^{1, 2},
WU Axin³,
SUN Tianqi^{1, 2}

1.
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
2.
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
3.
State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing 100878, China

Funds: The National Key R&D Program of China (2022YFB4501500, 2022YFB4501503)

摘要

摘要: 密文检索技术旨在提供密态数据查询服务，提高密文数据的可用性。但目前大多数机制仍存在不同程度的额外信息泄露，容易被攻击者捕获用于恢复明文信息与查询条件。如何强化密文检索中的隐私保护特性，实现信息泄露最小化已成为研究者关注的重点目标。近年来，随着硬件芯片技术与新型密码技术的快速发展，隐私保护密文检索研究方面涌现出了一批新成果，该文主要围绕多样化密文检索、基于可信执行环境的密文检索、隐匿信息检索等研究热点展开阐述，并总结了未来发展趋势。
- 密文检索 /
- 可信执行环境 /
- 隐匿信息检索
Abstract: The ciphertext retrieval techniques are designed to provide query services over encrypted data and to improve the availability of encrypted data. However, most of existing methods leak additional information besides the query result, which may be utilized by the attacker to recover plaintext data or queries. How to enhance the privacy-preserving features in ciphertext retrieval and achieve the minimisation of information leakage has received a lot of attention from researchers. In recent years, with the rapid development of hardware chip technology and new cryptographic technology, a number of novel methods were proposed for privacy-preserving ciphertext retrieval. This paper mainly focuses on the research hotspots of diversified ciphertext retrieval, ciphertext retrieval based on trusted execution environment and private information retrieval, and summarizes the future development trends.
- Ciphertext retrieval /
- Trusted execution environment /
- Private information retrieval

HTML全文

图 1 可搜索加密系统部署图

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图 2 基于Voronoi图的安全K近邻查询方案^[45]示意图

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图 3 基于聚类的安全近似K近邻查询方案^[47]示意图

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图 4 基于LSH的安全近似最近邻查询方案^[48]示意图

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图 5 半盲化R树索引结构示意图

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图 6 基于SGX的可搜索加密架构示意图

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图 7 基于SGX的布尔检索方案^[71]示意图

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图 8 3种典型的基于SGX平台的密文数据库体系结构

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图 9 EnclaveDB^[80]架构示意图

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图 10 StealthDB架构与查询处理流程示意图

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图 11 基于同态加密的cPIR基本框架

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图 12 OnionPIR的基本框架(以数据库表示为3维为例)

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图 13 标量版本的Regev加密和矩阵版本的Regev加密对比

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图 14 SimplePIR方案^[94]示意图

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图 15 Keyword PIR协议高层框架示意图

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图 16 Pantheon^[98]步骤示意图

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图 17 基于DPF的2-服务器PIR协议示意图

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表 1 PIR技术比较

	安全性假设	查询尺寸	响应尺寸	计算量
XPIR^[88]	基于Ring-LWE困难性假设	$ O\left(\sqrt[d]{n}\right) $	$ O\left({F}^{d-1}\right) $	$ O\left(n\right) $
SealPIR^[90]	基于Ring-LWE困难性假设	$ O(\sqrt[d]{n}/N) $	$ O\left({F}^{d-1}\right) $
OnionPIR^[92]	基于Ring-LWE困难性假设	$ O(\sqrt[d]{n}/N) $	$ O\left(1\right) $
SimplePIR^[94]	基于LWE困难性假设	$ O\left(\sqrt{n}\right) $	$ O\left(\sqrt{n}\right) $
FrodoPIR^[95]	基于LWE困难性假设	$ O\left(n\right) $	$ O\left(1\right) $
PIANO PIR^[96]	统计安全	$ O\left(\sqrt{n}\right) $	$ O\left(1\right) $	$ O\left(\sqrt{n}\right) $

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