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基于雾计算的智能电表用户虚拟环隐私保护方案

夏卓群 张一超 谷科 周楷鑫 李雄

夏卓群, 张一超, 谷科, 周楷鑫, 李雄. 基于雾计算的智能电表用户虚拟环隐私保护方案[J]. 电子与信息学报, 2023, 45(3): 819-827. doi: 10.11999/JEIT220618
引用本文: 夏卓群, 张一超, 谷科, 周楷鑫, 李雄. 基于雾计算的智能电表用户虚拟环隐私保护方案[J]. 电子与信息学报, 2023, 45(3): 819-827. doi: 10.11999/JEIT220618
XIA Zhuoqun, ZHANG Yichao, GU Ke, ZHOU Kaixin, LI Xiong. Virtual Ring Privacy Preserving Scheme Based on Fog Computing for Smart Meter System[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(3): 819-827. doi: 10.11999/JEIT220618
Citation: XIA Zhuoqun, ZHANG Yichao, GU Ke, ZHOU Kaixin, LI Xiong. Virtual Ring Privacy Preserving Scheme Based on Fog Computing for Smart Meter System[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(3): 819-827. doi: 10.11999/JEIT220618

基于雾计算的智能电表用户虚拟环隐私保护方案

doi: 10.11999/JEIT220618
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金(52177067, U1966207, 61532013)
详细信息
    作者简介:

    夏卓群:男,教授,研究方向为网络安全

    张一超:男,硕士生,研究方向为智能电网网络安全

    谷科:男,副教授,研究方向为网络与信息安全、人工智能安全等

    周楷鑫:男,硕士生,研究方向为智能电网网络安全

    李雄:男,教授,研究方向为密码学和网络与信息安全

    通讯作者:

    谷科 157246534@qq.com

  • 中图分类号: TN918

Virtual Ring Privacy Preserving Scheme Based on Fog Computing for Smart Meter System

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (52177067, U1966207, 61532013)
  • 摘要: 作为智能电网的基础组件,智能电表(SMS)可以定期向电力公司报告用户的详细用电量数据。但是智能电表也带来了一些安全问题,比如用户隐私泄露。该文提出了一种基于虚拟环的隐私保护方案,可以提供用电数据和用户身份的隐私,使攻击者无法知道匹配电力数据与用户身份的关系。在所提方案中,智能电表可以利用其虚拟环成员身份对其真实身份进行匿名化,并利用非对称加密和Paillier同态系统对其获得的用电量数据生成密文数据;然后智能电表将密文数据发送给其连接的雾节点,雾节点定期采集其管理的智能电表的密文数据。同时,雾节点对这些智能电表的虚拟环身份进行验证,然后将收集到的密文数据聚合并发送给控制中心;最后控制中心对聚合后的密文进行解密,得到用电量数据。实验结果表明所提方案在计算和通信成本上具有一定的优势。
  • 图  1  基于雾计算的智能电网架构

    图  2  系统模型

    图  3  系统初始化

    图  4  数据生成

    图  5  5种方案下$\mathrm{S}\mathrm{MS}$计算成本的比较

    图  6  4种方案下FN计算成本的比较

    图  7  不同用户数下$ \mathrm{F}\mathrm{N} $$ \mathrm{C}\mathrm{C} $通信成本的比较

    表  1  智能电网中的网络攻击总结

    GPS欺骗攻击拒绝服务攻击内部攻击虚假数据注入攻击中间人攻击重放攻击
    文献[4]
    文献[5]
    文献[6]
    文献[7]
    文献[8]
    文献[9]
    文献[10]
    文献[11]
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  2  符号和定义

    符号定义
    ${{ {{\rm{ID}}}_{ {{\rm{FN}}}_{j} } } }$雾节点${{\rm{FN}}}_{j}$的身份标识
    ${ {{{\rm{ID}}}_{ {{\rm{VR}}}_{j} } } }$虚拟环${{ {{\rm{VR}}}_{j} } }$的标识符
    ${k\_{\rm{pr}}}_{ {{\rm{VR}}}_{j} }$虚拟环${{\rm{VR}}}_{j}$的私钥
    ${k\_{\rm{pub}}}_{ {{\rm{VR}}}_{j} }$虚拟环${{\rm{VR}}}_{j}$的公钥
    ${k\_{\rm{pr}}}_{ {{\rm{FN}}}_{j} }$雾节点${{\rm{FN}}}_{j}$的私钥
    ${k\_{\rm{pub}}}_{ {{\rm{FN}}}_{j} }$雾节点${{\rm{FN}}}_{j}$的公钥
    ${K}_{ {{\rm{FC}}}_{j} }$雾节点${{\rm{FN}}}_{j}$和控制中心之间的共享密钥
    $ {E}_{k}\left(\mathrm{*}\right) $非对称加密函数用密钥$ k $加密数据*
    $ {D}_{k}\left(\mathrm{*}\right) $非对称解密函数用密钥$ k $解密数据*
    ${{\rm{Sign}}}_{k}\left(\mathrm{*}\right)$用密钥$ k $签名数据*
    ${ {\rm{Verify} } }_{k}\left(\mathrm{*}\right)$用密钥$ k $验证签名数据*
    $ h(\cdot) $单向哈希函数
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  3  符号和定义

    符号定义
    ${T}_{{\rm{enc}}}$公钥加密运算
    ${T}_{{\rm{dec}}}$私钥解密运算
    $ {C}_{e} $在$ {\mathbb{Z}}_{{N}^{2}} $上的指数运算
    $ {C}_{m} $在$ {\mathbb{Z}}_{{N}^{2}} $上的乘法运算
    ${C}_{{\rm{mg}}}$在$ \mathbb{G} $上的乘法运算
    ${C}_{{\rm{et}}}$在$ {\mathbb{G}}_{T} $上的指数运算
    $ {C}_{p} $双线性对运算
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  4  计算开销比较

    实体本文方案文献[21]方案文献[22]方案文献[23]方案文献[18]方案
    SMS$2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{et}}}+{T}_{{\rm{enc}}}$$2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{et}}}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}+4 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}$$2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{et}}}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}+3 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}$$3 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{et}}}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}+4 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}$${T}_{{\rm{enc}}}$
    FN$\left(n-1\right) \cdot {C}_{m}+{T}_{{\rm{dec}}}$$\begin{aligned} & \left(n-1\right) \cdot {C}_{m}+\left(n+3\right)\\& \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}} \end{aligned}$$\left(n-1\right) \cdot {C}_{m}+\left(n+2\right) \cdot {C}_{pt}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}$$\begin{aligned} & \left(n-1\right) \cdot {C}_{m}+\left(n+3\right)\\& \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}+{C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}\end{aligned}$$ - $
    CC${C}_{{\rm{et}}}$${C}_{{\rm{et}}}+2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}+4 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}+{C}_{{\rm{ett}}}$$ - $$\begin{aligned} & 2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{et}}}+{C}_{m}+2 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{pt}}}\\& +4 \cdot {C}_{{\rm{mgt}}}+{C}_{{\rm{ett}}}\end{aligned}$${T}_{{\rm{dnc}}}$
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  5  通信成本的比较(bit)

    FN-CC
    本文方案2272
    文献[21]方案2304
    文献[22]方案2272
    文献[23]方案2304
    下载: 导出CSV
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2022-05-17
  • 修回日期:  2022-06-29
  • 网络出版日期:  2022-07-08
  • 刊出日期:  2023-03-10

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