基于塔域的通用循环移位掩码设计方法

严迎建; 汪晶; 刘燕江

doi:10.11999/JEIT210588

基于塔域的通用循环移位掩码设计方法

doi: 10.11999/JEIT210588

中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学郑州 450001

详细信息

作者简介:
严迎建：男，1973年生，教授，研究方向为安全专用芯片设计技术、侧信道分析等

汪晶：女，1997年生，硕士生，研究领域为安全专用芯片设计技术、侧信道分析

刘燕江：男，1990年生，博士后，研究领域为安全专用芯片设计技术、侧信道分析和硬件木马检测等

通讯作者:
汪晶　cristal_97@163.com

中图分类号: TN918.4; TP309.7
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2021-06-16
- 修回日期: 2021-07-15
- 网络出版日期: 2021-08-18
- 刊出日期: 2021-09-16

Design Method of Generic Cyclic Shift Mask Based on Tower Field

Information Engineering University, People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, Zhengzhou 450001, China

摘要

摘要: 该文分析了塔域的运算特性，提出了基于塔域分解的非线性变换实现方法，设计了求逆运算的随机掩码方案，利用循环移位对随机掩码进行移位变换，形成了基于塔域的循环移位随机掩码方案，实现了所有中间值的随机化隐藏，提高了算法的抗能量攻击能力。该文在高级加密标准(AES)算法上进行验证，利用T-test和相关性分析对掩码方案进行安全性评估。该掩码方案无明显信息泄露点，可有效抵抗相关性攻击，另外较现有文献的掩码方案，资源开销更小，通用性更好。
- 能量攻击 /
- 掩码 /
- 复合域 /
- 分组密码
Abstract: The operation characteristics of the tower field is analyzed, a nonlinear transformation realization method based on the tower domain is proposed. A random mask schedule for the inversion operation is designed, and cyclic shift is used in the randomization of mask, forming cyclic shift random mask scheme based on the tower domain, realizing the randomized hiding of all intermediate values and improving the ability of the algorithm to resist power attacks. The method proposed is verified on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm with the use of T-test and correlation analysis to evaluate the security of the masking scheme. There is no obvious information leakage points in the schedule, proving the ability to effectively resist correlation attacks. In addition, compared with the mask schedule in existing reference, the mask schedule proposed in this paper has less resource overhead and better generality.
- Power attack /
- Mask /
- Composite field /
- Block cipher

HTML全文

图 1 基于塔域的S盒运算结构

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图 2 GF(((2)²)²)²上元素乘法逆计算结构图

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图 3 基于塔域AES加掩S盒硬件实现

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图 4 基于塔域的AES-128加掩算法

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图 5 基于塔域的循环移位加掩AES功能仿真图

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图 6 波形采集设备连接图

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图 7 有无防护AES功耗轨迹t检验结果

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图 8 无防护AES相关能量攻击结果

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图 9 本文所提防护方案AES相关能量攻击结果

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表 1 加掩S盒计算算法

输入：m,n,x
输出：MSB
(1)　　for i=0 to 255 do
(2)　　${\rm{MSB}}(x \oplus m) = {\rm{SB}}(x) \oplus n$
(3)　　end for
(4)　　Return MSB

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表 2 加法链计算算法

输入：x
输出：x²⁵⁴
(1)	z←x²	[z=x²]
(2)	y←zx	[y=x²x=x³]
(3)	w←y⁴	[w=(x³)⁴=x¹²]
(4)	y←yw	[w=x³x¹²=x¹⁵]
(5)	y←y¹⁶	[w=(x¹⁵)¹⁶=x²⁴⁰]
(6)	y←yw	[w=x²⁴⁰x¹²=x²⁵²]
(7)	y←yz	[w=x²⁵²x²=x²⁵⁴]

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表 3 基于塔域的循环移位掩码加密算法

输入：明文X₀，密钥K
输出：密文$ {X}_{R+1}^{{'}{'}} $
(1)　　计算第1轮的输入数据$ {X}_{1}^{{'}} $,
${X'_1} = {X_0} \oplus {K_0} \oplus M$
(2)　　计算轮函数的输出
for r=1 to R–1, 　　　　 $ \begin{array}{l} {{X''}_{r + 1}} = P(S{_{(M,N)}}({{X'}_r})) \oplus {K_r} \\ {{X'}_{r + 1}} = {{X''}_{r + 1}} \oplus ({\tau _{{c_r} + 1}}(M) \oplus P({\tau _{{c_r}}}(N))) \\ {c_{r + 1}} = ({c_r} + 1)\boldsymbolod t \end{array} $
(3)　　计算密文$ {X}_{R+1}^{{'}{'}} $ 　　　　 $ \begin{array}{l} {{X''}_{R + 1}} = S{_{(M,N)}}({{X'}_R}) \oplus {K_R} \\ {{X'}_{R + 1}} = {{X''}_{R + 1}} \oplus {\tau _{{c_{R + 1}}}}(N) \end{array} $

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表 4 不同方案总综合结果比较

方案	LUT	FF	BUFG
无防护AES	1245(303600)	609(607200)	1(32)
RSM方案^[9]	10620(303600)	737(607200)	1(32)
S盒共用掩码方案^[15]	3897(303600)	737(607200)	1(32)
本文方案	2918(303600)	394(607200)	1(32)

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