Study on Effect of ElectroMagnetic Fault Injection Attack on Dynamic Random Access Memory
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摘要: 以探索电磁故障注入(EMFI)攻击对动态随机存取存储器(DRAM)的安全性影响为目标，该文使用电磁故障注入攻击平台对DRAM进行了扫描攻击，对出现的故障进行统计分类，随后基于DRAM的基本结构分析阐述了造成故障的机理, 最后展示了通过电磁脉冲攻击DRAM对计算机系统的安全威胁。实验表明电磁脉冲在DRAM中既可以引起瞬时故障也可以引起持续性故障，且以多故障为主。分析发现，电磁脉冲故障攻击技术可以以低的时间和空间分辨率向DRAM的指定地址注入持续性故障。另外，该文成功地将持续性故障注入到了存储在DRAM中的AES-128程序中并破解了其密钥，证明了使用电磁脉冲对DRAM进行攻击能对计算机系统造成安全威胁，展示了DRAM安全性的研究对硬件系统安全具有重要意义。Abstract: To investigate the effect of ElectroMagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI) attacks on the security of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), DRAMs are applied to an EMFI platform and are attacked with same attack settings firstly in this paper. Firstly, the attack results are collected and the faults are classified. Secondly, the mechanism of the faults occurred in the experiments are analyzed based on the fundamental structure of DRAM. Finally, the threats of the faults occurred in DRAM to the security of computer system are analyzed. In the experiments, multiple transient faults and multiple persistent faults are found. According to the experiments and analysis, it is found that the EMFI can inject persistent faults into the specified addresses of DRAM with low spatio-temporal resolution. In addition, persistent faults are successfully injected into S-box of AES-128 that stored in DRAM in this paper, and the key of AES is recovered by exploiting the faults. The experiment of key cracking indicates that EMFI attacks on DRAM pose serious security threats to computer systems, and the experiment indicates that researching on the security of DRAM is of great significance to hardware security.
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表 1 列出的4个字节中消失的值
1 2 3 4 5 第1 Byte 0x40 0x5d 0xef 0xf7 0xf8 第2 Byte 0x22 0x2d 0x3a 0x88 0x95 … … … … … … 第15 Byte 0x02 0x0d 0x15 0xa7 0xba 第16 Byte 0x4f 0x52 0xe5 0xea 0xfd 
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