Improved Design of Constant Power Consumption Circuit Based on Differential Pass-transistor Precharge Logic
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摘要: 通过分析差分传输管预充电逻辑(DP2L)的电路结构，发现该电路还无法达到完全的功耗恒定特性，仍然存在被功耗攻击的风险。针对该问题，该文对DP2L的电路结构进行改进，并用Hspice对改进前后的电路进行模拟仿真测试。实验表明：改进后的DP2L电路结构具有更好的功耗恒定特性，更能满足该逻辑电路的设计要求。
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关键词:
- 功耗攻击 /
- 功耗恒定 /
- 双轨预充电逻辑 /
- 差分传输管预充电逻辑
Abstract: By analyzing the circuit structure of Differential Pass-transistor Precharge Logic (DP2L), it is found that the circuit can not achieve the complete constant power consumption, and there is still a risk of being attacked by power attack. To solve this problem, the circuit structure of DP2L is improved by this paper, and the circuits before and after the improvement are simulated using Hspice. The experimental results show that the improved DP2L circuit structure has better characteristics of constant power consumption and can better meet the design requirements of the logic circuit. -
表 1 改进前DP2L单轨电路相关参数
输入条件 $a$=0, $b$=0 $a$=0, $b$=1 $a$=1, $b$=0 $a$=1, $b$=1 “0→1”翻转电流(μA) / 48.86 87.82 62.12 “1→0”翻转电流(μA) / 58.17 38.75 97.74 NED(%) 33.05 
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表 2 改进后DP2L单轨电路相关参数
输入条件 $a$=0, $b$=0 $a$=0, $b$=1 $a$=1, $b$=0 $a$=1, $b$=1 “0→1”翻转电流(μA) / 108.32 107.65 140.18 “1→0”翻转电流(μA) / 97.96 98.31 136.58 NED(%) 25.58
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表 3 改进后DP2L双轨电路相关参数
输入条件 $a$=0, $b$=0 $a$=0, $b$=1 $a$=1, $b$=0 $a$=1, $b$=1 “0→1”翻转电流(μA) 139.12 139.01 139.67 139.51 “1→0”翻转电流(μA) 136.73 136.51 136.95 136.82 NED(%) 0.40
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