Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion
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摘要: 为解决用户在混币过程中无法请求退出的问题，该文提出一种支持用户匿名撤销混币的方案。采用承诺技术将用户和其目的地址进行绑定；当用户请求退出混洗服务时，利用累加器和知识签名对承诺进行零知识证明。最后将撤销用户的混淆输出地址修改为其指定的目的地址。安全性分析表明，该方案基于双离散对数问题和强RSA假设满足退群用户匿名性，且不用修改当前比特币系统即可实施。在n(n≥10)个诚实用户参与的混淆过程中，方案允许至多n–2个用户退出混币操作。Abstract: In order to solve the problem that users can not request to exit during the bitcoin confusion process, an anonymous revocation scheme for Bitcoin confusion is proposed. The commitment is used to bind the user with its destination address. When the user requests to quit the shuffle service, a zero-knowledge proof of the commitment is made using the accumulator and the signatures of knowledge. Finally, the shuffled output address of the user who quits the service is modified to its destination address. Security analysis shows that the scheme satisfies the anonymity of the user who quits the service based on the double discrete logarithm problem and the strong RSA assumption, and can be implemented without modifying the current bitcoin system. The scheme allows at most n–2 users to exit in the confusion process of n (n≥10) honest users participation.
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Key words:
- Privacy protection /
- Bitcoin confusion /
- Revocable
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表 2 不同方案理论执行时间对比
方案 加密 模乘 模指数 哈希 椭圆曲线
上的点乘CoinParty[10] ${\left( {{n^2}} \right)_{\nu \left( E \right)}}$ ${\left( {8n} \right)_{\nu \left( m \right)}}$ ${\left( {4n} \right)_{\nu \left( M \right)}}$ ${\left( {4n} \right)_{\nu \left( H \right)}}$ ${\left( {10n} \right)_{\nu \left( R \right)}}$ ZeroCoin[14] 0 ${\left( {9n} \right)_{\nu \left( m \right)}}$ ${\left( {12n} \right)_{\nu \left( M \right)}}$ ${\left( n \right)_{\nu \left( H \right)}}$ 0 CoinExit ${\left( {2{n^2}} \right)_{\nu \left( E \right)}}$ ${\left( {11n} \right)_{\nu \left( m \right)}}$ ${\left( {17n} \right)_{\nu \left( M \right)}}$ ${\left( {2n} \right)_{\nu \left( H \right)}}$ ${\left( {5n} \right)_{\nu \left( R \right)}}$ 
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