Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of the Digital Video Broadcasting-common Scrambling Algorithm
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摘要:
数字视频广播通用加扰算法(DVB-CSA)是一种混合对称加密算法，由分组密码加密和流密码加密两部分组成。该算法通常用于保护视讯压缩标准(MPEG-2)中的信号流。主要研究DVB-CSA分组加密算法(DVB-CSA-Block Cipher, CSA-BC)的不可能差分性质。通过利用S盒的具体信息，该文构造了CSA-BC的22轮不可能差分区分器，该区分器的长度比已有最好结果长2轮。进一步，利用构造的22轮不可能差分区分器，攻击了缩减的25轮CSA-BC，该攻击可以恢复24 bit种子密钥。攻击的数据复杂度、时间复杂度和存储复杂度分别为253.3个选择明文、232.5次加密和224个存储单元。对于CSA-BC的不可能差分分析，目前已知最好结果能够攻击21轮的CSA-BC并恢复16 bit的种子密钥量。就攻击的长度和恢复的密钥量而言，该文的攻击结果大大改进了已有最好结果。
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关键词:
- 混合对称密码 /
- 分组密码 /
- 数字视频广播通用加扰算法 /
- 不可能差分分析
Abstract:The Digital Video Broadcasting-Common Scrambling Algorithm (DVB-CSA) is a hybrid symmetric cipher. It is made up of the block cipher encryption and the stream cipher encryption. DVB-CSA is often used to protect MPEG-2 signal streams. This paper focuses on impossible differential cryptanalysis of the block cipher in DVB-CSA called CSA-BC. By exploiting the details of the S-box, a 22-round impossible differential is constructed, which is two rounds more than the previous best result. Furthermore, a 25-round impossible differential attack on CSA-BC is presented, which can recover 24 bit key. For the attack, the data complexity, the computational complexity and the memory complexity are 253.3 chosen plaintexts, 232.5 encryptions and 224 units, respectively. For impossible differential cryptanalysis of CSA-BC, the previous best result can attack 21-round CSA-BC and recover 16 bit key. In terms of the round number and the recovered key, the result significantly improves the previous best result.
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表 1 算法1：CSA-BC的加密流程
输入：明文${{M}} = ({M_0},{M_1},{M_2},{M_3},{M_4},{M_5},{M_6},{M_7})$ 输出：密文${{C}} = ({C_0},{C_1},{C_2},{C_3},{C_4},{C_5},{C_6},{C_7})$ (1) ${{{S}}^0} = {{M}}$; (2) for r=0 to 55 (3) ${{{S}}^{r + 1}} = f({{{S}}^r},(k_{8r}^E,k_{8r + 1}^E, \cdots ,k_{8r + 7}^E))$; (4) end for (5) ${{C}} = {{{S}}^{56}}$. 
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表 2 加密方向的差分传播规律
轮数 差分传播 约束条件 0 $(0|0|0|0|0|0|u|0)$ 1 $(0|0|0|0|0|u|0|0)$ 2 $(0|0|0|0|u|0|0|0)$ 3 $(0|0|0|u|0|0|0|0)$ 4 $(0|0|u|0|0|0|0|0)$ 5 $(0|u|0|0|0|0|0|0)$ 6 $(u|0|0|0|0|0|0|0)$ 7 $(0|u|u|u|0|0|0|u)$ 8 $(u|u|u|0|0|{{P}}{u_1}|u|{u_1})$ ${u_1} \in \Delta S(u)$ 9 $(u|0|u|u|{{P}}{u_1}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1}|u \oplus {u_2})$ ${u_2} \in \Delta S({u_1})$ 10 $(0|0|0|u \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1} \oplus {{P}}{u_3}|u \oplus {u_2}|u \oplus {u_3})$ ${u_3} \in \Delta S(u \oplus {u_2})$ 11 $(0|0|u \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1} \oplus {{P}}{u_3}|u \oplus {u_2} \oplus {{P}}{u_4}|u \oplus {u_3}|{u_4})$ ${u_4} \in \Delta S(u \oplus {u_3})$ 12 $(0|u \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1} \oplus {{P}}{u_3}|u \oplus {u_2} \oplus {{P}}{u_4}|u \oplus {u_3} \oplus {{P}}{u_5}|{u_4}|{u_5})$ ${u_5} \in \Delta S({u_4})$ 13 $(u \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1} \oplus {{P}}{u_3}|u \oplus {u_2} \oplus {{P}}{u_4}|u \oplus {u_3} \oplus {{P}}{u_5}|{u_4} \oplus {{P}}{u_6}|{u_5}|{u_6})$ ${u_6} \in \Delta S({u_5})$ 14 $\begin{aligned} (u \oplus {{P}}{u_2}|{u_1} \oplus {{P}}{u_3} \oplus u \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|{u_2} \oplus {{P}}{u_4} \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|\\ {u_3} \oplus {{P}}{u_5} \oplus {{P}}{u_1}|{u_4} \oplus {{P}}{u_6}|{u_5} \oplus {{P}}{u_7}|{u_6}|u \oplus {{P}}{u_1} \oplus {u_7}) \end{aligned} $ ${u_7} \in \Delta S({u_6})$
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表 3 解密方向的差分传播规律
轮数 差分传播 约束条件 22 $(0|v|v|v|0|0|0|v)$ 21 $(v|0|0|0|0|0|0|0)$ 20 $(0|v|0|0|0|0|0|0)$ 19 $(0|0|v|0|0|0|0|0)$ 18 $(0|0|0|v|0|0|0|0)$ 17 $(0|0|0|0|v|0|0|0)$ 16 $(0|0|0|0|0|v|0|0)$ 15 $(0|0|0|0|0|0|v|0)$ 14 $({v_1}|0|{v_1}|{v_1}|{v_1}|0|{{P}}{v_1}|v)$ ${v_1} \in \Delta S(v)$
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