A Power Side-channel Attack Framework for Lattice-based Post Quantum Cryptography

HU Wei; YUAN Chaoxuan; ZHENG Jian; WANG Xingxin; LI Beibei; TANG Shibo

doi:10.11999/JEIT230267

Volume 45 Issue 9

Sep. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2023 > 45(9): 3210-3217

HU Wei, YUAN Chaoxuan, ZHENG Jian, WANG Xingxin, LI Beibei, TANG Shibo. A Power Side-channel Attack Framework for Lattice-based Post Quantum Cryptography[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(9): 3210-3217. doi: 10.11999/JEIT230267

Citation:

HU Wei, YUAN Chaoxuan, ZHENG Jian, WANG Xingxin, LI Beibei, TANG Shibo. A Power Side-channel Attack Framework for Lattice-based Post Quantum Cryptography[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(9): 3210-3217. doi: 10.11999/JEIT230267

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A Power Side-channel Attack Framework for Lattice-based Post Quantum Cryptography

doi: 10.11999/JEIT230267

School of Cyberspace Security, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, China

Funds: The National Key R&D Program (2022YFB3103800)

Received Date: 2023-04-13
Rev Recd Date: 2023-06-10

Available Online: 2023-06-17

Publish Date: 2023-09-27

Abstract

Abstract

To address the security threat of quantum commutating on classic public key cryptography. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has gradually become a new generation cryptography technology. Although PQC ensures the security strength of the algorithms through mathematical theory, it can still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks during the execution of cipher implementation. A power side channel attack framework for lattice-based PQC is developped. By investigating the relationship between secret polynomial coefficient and power consumption, a template is created for the side-channel analysis of the Kyber algorithm. A novel high-order chosen ciphertext attack method is proposed, and power side channel attack on Kyber is realized successfully. Compared with existing work, the number of ciphertexts required to recover the entire Kyber512 key and Kyber768 key is reduced by 58.48% and 47.5% respectively. The feasibility of the proposed power side channel attack framework and the effectiveness of the proposed high-order chosen ciphertext attack method have been verified by experimental results. The method and tool support required for subsequent evaluation of the side channel security threat encountered by PQC is provided by this work.
- Post-Quantum Cryptography(PQC),
- Power side-channel,
- Attack framework,
- High-order chosen ciphertext attack,
- Kyber

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References(15)

References

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