A Highly Efficient Secure Electronic Auction Protocol with Full Anonymity and Fairness

Xiao Qing-hua; Ping Ling-di; Pan Xue-zeng

Volume 27 Issue 4

Apr. 2005

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2005 > 27(4): 666-669

Xiao Qing-hua, Ping Ling-di, Pan Xue-zeng . A Highly Efficient Secure Electronic Auction Protocol with Full Anonymity and Fairness[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(4): 666-669.

Citation:

Xiao Qing-hua, Ping Ling-di, Pan Xue-zeng . A Highly Efficient Secure Electronic Auction Protocol with Full Anonymity and Fairness[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(4): 666-669.

Citation:

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A Highly Efficient Secure Electronic Auction Protocol with Full Anonymity and Fairness

Received Date: 2003-10-09
Rev Recd Date: 2004-07-29
Publish Date: 2005-04-19

Abstract

Abstract

The protection of bidder privacy and the prevention of bidder default are the keys in the designing of secure auction protocol. But up to now, the research on both of them is still very weak. Aiming at this drawback, this paper designed a new secure and efficient auction protocol. Using the digital signature technology and bit commitment protocol, it not only guarantees the non-repudiation and anonymity of bidders, but also ensures that nobody can manipulate others in the whole auction And also, this protocol achieves the valuable properties of bid secrecy and verifiability. Even when malicious bidders collude with auctioneers, it is still secure and valid. More importantly, this protocol supports the second-price principle and optimal distribution of goods. Compared with previous works, this protocol provides better extensibility and higher efficiency, and is suitable for large-scale distributed auction.

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References(1)

References

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