On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game

Wang YuFeng; Wang WenDong; Cheng ShiDuan

Volume 27 Issue 9

Sep. 2005

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Wang YuFeng, Wang WenDong, Cheng ShiDuan. On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(9): 1488-1492.

Citation:

Wang YuFeng, Wang WenDong, Cheng ShiDuan. On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(9): 1488-1492.

Wang YuFeng, Wang WenDong, Cheng ShiDuan. On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(9): 1488-1492.

Citation:

Wang YuFeng, Wang WenDong, Cheng ShiDuan. On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2005, 27(9): 1488-1492.

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On Revenue-Maximized Pricing for WCDMA Networks Based on Stackelberg Game

Wang YuFeng^{①②;王文东},
Wang WenDong,
Cheng ShiDuan

Received Date: 2004-03-03
Rev Recd Date: 2005-06-15
Publish Date: 2005-09-19

Abstract

Abstract

The problem that how to set the price to maximize revenue in WCDMA networks is investigated in this paper. Instead of adopting congestion pricing mechanism, this paper imposes fixed usage price on throughput of each user, which is assumed to be the function of network congestion and usage cost. Based on above assumptions, the net utility functions of users are provided and Stackelberg game is adopted to model the interaction between network and users. That is, network sets the price to maximize revenue, and in response to the price, users maximize their net utility functions to achieve equilibriums. The paper provides the quantitative relation between revenue and the number of admitted users, and infers that although, technically speaking, network can increase system capacity to admit more users through decreasing transmission rate of users, the network has no incentive to adopt this policy. Conversely, network has the incentive to pert＇arm congestion control.

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References(1)

References

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