The Spoofing Detection Method of Navigation Terminal Using Partial Authenticated Signals

WANG Huanyu; LIN Honglei; OU Gang; TANG Xiaomei

doi:10.11999/JEIT240067

Volume 46 Issue 10

Oct. 2024

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2024 > 46(10): 4053-4061

WANG Huanyu, LIN Honglei, OU Gang, TANG Xiaomei. The Spoofing Detection Method of Navigation Terminal Using Partial Authenticated Signals[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2024, 46(10): 4053-4061. doi: 10.11999/JEIT240067

Citation:

WANG Huanyu, LIN Honglei, OU Gang, TANG Xiaomei. The Spoofing Detection Method of Navigation Terminal Using Partial Authenticated Signals[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2024, 46(10): 4053-4061. doi: 10.11999/JEIT240067

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The Spoofing Detection Method of Navigation Terminal Using Partial Authenticated Signals

doi: 10.11999/JEIT240067

Key Laboratory of Satellite Navigation Technology, College of Electronic Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China

Received Date: 2024-01-29
Rev Recd Date: 2024-09-05

Available Online: 2024-09-09

Publish Date: 2024-10-30

Abstract

Abstract

The navigation signal authentication service is in the initial stage. The coverage multiple numbers of the authentication signal to ground can not meet the requirement of independent positioning and timing. The existing research has paid little attention to the deception detection method based on partially trusted signals at this stage. Aiming at the status quo, according to the principle of spoofing attack, a spoofing detection method is proposed based on the pseudo-distance residual of the authentication signal, and the spoofing detection model is established in this scenario, and the factors that affect the detection performance of the proposed method are analyzed. After simulation, the average deception detection probability of the algorithm can reach 0.96 when the positioning deviation is 100 m, the positioning accuracy is about 10 m, and the number of trusted satellites is 3. In addition, the blind area of the algorithm is analyzed, and it is proved that the algorithm is effective for most of the deception positions.
- Anti-spoofing,
- Navigation authentication signal,
- Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM),
- Pseudo-range residuals

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References(16)

References

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