Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion

Xuelian LI; Haiyu WANG; Juntao GAO; Wei LI

doi:10.11999/JEIT180874

Volume 41 Issue 8

Aug. 2019

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Xuelian LI, Haiyu WANG, Juntao GAO, Wei LI. Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(8): 1815-1822. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180874

Citation:

Xuelian LI, Haiyu WANG, Juntao GAO, Wei LI. Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(8): 1815-1822. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180874

Xuelian LI, Haiyu WANG, Juntao GAO, Wei LI. Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(8): 1815-1822. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180874

Citation:

Xuelian LI, Haiyu WANG, Juntao GAO, Wei LI. Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(8): 1815-1822. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180874

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Anonymous Revocation Scheme for Bitcoin Confusion

doi: 10.11999/JEIT180874

1.
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China
2.
School of Telecommunications engineering, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China

Funds: The Nation Key Research and Development Program of China (2016YFB0800601), The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61303217, 61502372)

Received Date: 2018-09-07
Rev Recd Date: 2018-12-09

Available Online: 2019-02-26

Publish Date: 2019-08-01

Abstract

Abstract

In order to solve the problem that users can not request to exit during the bitcoin confusion process, an anonymous revocation scheme for Bitcoin confusion is proposed. The commitment is used to bind the user with its destination address. When the user requests to quit the shuffle service, a zero-knowledge proof of the commitment is made using the accumulator and the signatures of knowledge. Finally, the shuffled output address of the user who quits the service is modified to its destination address. Security analysis shows that the scheme satisfies the anonymity of the user who quits the service based on the double discrete logarithm problem and the strong RSA assumption, and can be implemented without modifying the current bitcoin system. The scheme allows at most n–2 users to exit in the confusion process of n (n≥10) honest users participation.
- Privacy protection,
- Bitcoin confusion,
- Revocable

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References(19)

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