Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80

FU Lishi; JIN Chenhui

doi:10.11999/JEIT150673

Volume 38 Issue 4

Apr. 2016

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2016 > 38(4): 848-855

FU Lishi, JIN Chenhui. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2016, 38(4): 848-855. doi: 10.11999/JEIT150673

Citation:

FU Lishi, JIN Chenhui. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2016, 38(4): 848-855. doi: 10.11999/JEIT150673

FU Lishi, JIN Chenhui. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2016, 38(4): 848-855. doi: 10.11999/JEIT150673

Citation:

FU Lishi, JIN Chenhui. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2016, 38(4): 848-855. doi: 10.11999/JEIT150673

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Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on 13-round MIBS-80

doi: 10.11999/JEIT150673

FU Lishi¹,
JIN Chenhui¹

Funds:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61272488, 61402523)

Received Date: 2015-06-04
Rev Recd Date: 2015-11-25
Publish Date: 2016-04-19

Abstract

Abstract

This paper presents the 13-round impossible differential cryptanalysis on MIBS-80 for the first time. Firstly, this paper filters the plaintexts based on the impossible differentia of S-box in MIBS-80. Secondly, by taking advantage of the restrict relation between key in the first round and in the second round, the restrict relation between key in the first round and in the 13th round, the number of plaintexts is further reduced. To sum up,218.2times can be eliminated as big as the number of plaintexts eliminated in former impossible attacks, therefore both the time complexity and memory complexity are saved. Besides, by looking up various tables to get the needed key bits in the attack, the time complexity and memory complexity are thereafter reduced. Finally, 80 independent key bit are used to recover the main key, which ensures that only the right key is kept. The presented attack needs260.1 chosen plaintexts,269.5 13-round encryptions and271.2 64 bit blocks, which is the best result of impossible differential attack on MIBS so far.
- Lightweight block cipher,
- MIBS-80 algorithm,
- Impossible differential cryptanalysis,
- Restrict relation between keys

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References(31)

References

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