A Computational Offloading Incentive Forward Contract Taking into Account Risk Appetite

ZHANG Biling; JIAO Zhengyang; LIU Jiahua; GUO Caili

doi:10.11999/JEIT230617

Volume 46 Issue 6

Jun. 2024

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2024 > 46(6): 2619-2626

ZHANG Biling, JIAO Zhengyang, LIU Jiahua, GUO Caili. A Computational Offloading Incentive Forward Contract Taking into Account Risk Appetite[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2024, 46(6): 2619-2626. doi: 10.11999/JEIT230617

Citation:

ZHANG Biling, JIAO Zhengyang, LIU Jiahua, GUO Caili. A Computational Offloading Incentive Forward Contract Taking into Account Risk Appetite[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2024, 46(6): 2619-2626. doi: 10.11999/JEIT230617

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A Computational Offloading Incentive Forward Contract Taking into Account Risk Appetite

doi: 10.11999/JEIT230617

School of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Post and Telecommunication, Beijing 100876, China

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (62171060)

Received Date: 2023-06-21
Rev Recd Date: 2024-04-28

Available Online: 2024-05-15

Publish Date: 2024-06-30

Abstract

Abstract

In edge computing networks, to stimulate the Edge Computing Nodes (ECNs) to assist in computation offloading to relieve the pressure of computing Service Provider (SP), a forward transaction oriented incentive mechanism is studied. Considering that there is information asymmetry between SP and ECNs and the uncertainty of ECNs idle resources can lead to cooperation risks, a risk-aware forward incentive mechanism based on contract theory for computation offloading is proposed. Firstly, a risk preference model for nodes is established; and then the Individual Rationality (IR) constraints and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are defined, and the incentive problem is modeled as a forward contract design problem to maximize the benefits of SP; finally, the optimal forward contract is derived after constraint simplification. The simulation results verify the feasibility and rationality of the proposed forward contract, and prove that the contract can effectively incentivize ECNs to participate in computation offloading and increase the profits of SP.
- Computation offloading,
- Contract theory,
- Forward contract,
- Risk preference

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References(18)

References

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