7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher

YANG Yang; LIU Wenhao; ZENG Guang

doi:10.11999/JEIT211438

Volume 45 Issue 2

Feb. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2023 > 45(2): 617-625

YANG Yang, LIU Wenhao, ZENG Guang. 7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(2): 617-625. doi: 10.11999/JEIT211438

Citation:

YANG Yang, LIU Wenhao, ZENG Guang. 7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(2): 617-625. doi: 10.11999/JEIT211438

YANG Yang, LIU Wenhao, ZENG Guang. 7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(2): 617-625. doi: 10.11999/JEIT211438

Citation:

YANG Yang, LIU Wenhao, ZENG Guang. 7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2023, 45(2): 617-625. doi: 10.11999/JEIT211438

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7-round Subspace Trail Distinguisher of 3D Cipher

doi: 10.11999/JEIT211438

School of Cryptography Engineering, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450000, China

Funds: The Open Fund Project of the State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing (2020A08)

Received Date: 2021-12-06
Rev Recd Date: 2022-06-13

Available Online: 2022-06-30

Publish Date: 2023-02-07

Abstract

Abstract

Subspace trail attack is a new analysis method for block ciphers. The properties of subspaces of 3D cipher which uses a new structure of AES-like ciphers is studied. First of all, a 3-round definite subspace trail of 3Dcipher is constructed in this paper, combined with the intersection property of subspaces, and the 7-round subspace trail impossible differential distinguisher of 3D cipher is obtained for the first time. Its data complexity is $ {2^{193.1}} $ chosen plaintexts, time complexity is $ {2^{202.3}} $ look-up operations, and the success rate is $ 60.6\% $. The multiple-of-n property means that all plaintext pairs in the subspace undergo a round of encryption, and the number of ciphertext pairs whose differences belong to a certain subspace is a multiple of n. Using this property, a 7-round structural distinguisher of 3D cipher is constructed. The data complexity is $ {2^{128}} $ chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is $ {2^{129.6}} $ look-up operations, the storage complexity is $ {2^{128}} $ Byte, and the success rate is greater than $ 99.99\% $.
- Subspace trail,
- Impossible difference,
- Structural distinguisher,
- 3D cipher

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References(16)

References

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