Dynamic Compensation Based Low-cost Power-analysis Countermeasure for Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Its Hardware Structure

Wei LI; Han ZENG; Tao CHEN; Longmei NAN

doi:10.11999/JEIT210581

Volume 43 Issue 9

Sep. 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2021 > 43(9): 2439-2448

Wei LI, Han ZENG, Tao CHEN, Longmei NAN. Dynamic Compensation Based Low-cost Power-analysis Countermeasure for Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Its Hardware Structure[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2021, 43(9): 2439-2448. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210581

Citation:

Wei LI, Han ZENG, Tao CHEN, Longmei NAN. Dynamic Compensation Based Low-cost Power-analysis Countermeasure for Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Its Hardware Structure[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2021, 43(9): 2439-2448. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210581

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Dynamic Compensation Based Low-cost Power-analysis Countermeasure for Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Its Hardware Structure

doi: 10.11999/JEIT210581

Wei LI^{1
,
,},
Han ZENG¹,
Tao CHEN¹,
Longmei NAN²

1.
PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450000, China
2.
State Key Laboratory of ASIC and System, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

Funds: The National Science and Technology Major Project (2018ZX01027101-004), The Foundation Strengthening Program (2019-JCJQ-JJ-123)

Received Date: 2021-06-16
Rev Recd Date: 2021-08-16

Available Online: 2021-08-27

Publish Date: 2021-09-16

Abstract

Abstract

The power-analysis countermeasure for Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) chips endures large area, power consumption and performance degradation. In this paper, the difference in the probability distribution of the intermediate data Hamming distance is analyzed when the key guess is correct and incorrect in the point multiplication of ECC. A power compensation method based on dynamic Hamming distance control is proposed, which uses the simulated annealing algorithm offline to find the optimal mapping matrix. Finally, a mapping compensation model of equal probability on the elliptic curve cryptographic hardware is formed, which greatly reduces the correlation between intermediate data and power consumption. At the same time, a low-cost synchronous power compensation circuit is designed in the guidance of this model. Under the CMOS 40 nm process, the area of protected ECC128 is only increased by 22.8%. Experiments and tests are carried out on the Sakura-G board. The power overhead is 18.8%, and the number of minimum leakage traces is greater than 10⁴, which is increased by 312 times. This countermeasure is the same as randomization with low cost and no impact on the throughput rate, which is suitable for high-speed or resource-constrained ECC circuits.
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC),
- Correlation Power Analysis (CPA),
- Low cost,
- Simulated annealing algorithm

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References(17)

References

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