Coalition Structure Generation Constrained by Trust and Utility Relationship

Xiangrong TONG; Ziyi REN

doi:10.11999/JEIT200509

Volume 43 Issue 7

Jul. 2021

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Xiangrong TONG, Ziyi REN. Coalition Structure Generation Constrained by Trust and Utility Relationship[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2021, 43(7): 2055-2062. doi: 10.11999/JEIT200509

Citation:

Xiangrong TONG, Ziyi REN. Coalition Structure Generation Constrained by Trust and Utility Relationship[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2021, 43(7): 2055-2062. doi: 10.11999/JEIT200509

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Coalition Structure Generation Constrained by Trust and Utility Relationship

doi: 10.11999/JEIT200509 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT200509

Xiangrong TONG^,,
Ziyi REN

School of Computer and Control Engineering, Yantai University, Yantai 264005, China

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (62072392,61972360), Shandong Province Major Science and Technology Innovation Project (2019JZZY020131)

Received Date: 2020-06-23
Rev Recd Date: 2020-12-26

Available Online: 2021-02-06

Publish Date: 2021-07-10

Abstract

Abstract

The coalition structure generation is an important domain of distributed artificial intelligence. Most coalition formation models are only based on the utility, and any number of coalitions are permitted, which makes it be NP complexity difficult to generate the optimal coalition structure. Actually, Trust is the base of cooperation and has direct effect on the final utility. So, not only utility but also trust relationship should be seriously considered. To this end, the utility constraint is extended to trust and utility constraint, a two-tuples is used to represent utility and trust, which is the base of coalition structure generation. Inspired by the classic s-t-cut algorithm for graph cut, coalition structure generation constrained by trust and utility relationship is investigated. Assuming that individual rationality of agents and the stability of coalition (there is no block) is satisfied, the network is cut by the relationship of utility and trust to formation coalitions. The proposed algorithms of coalition structure generation named MT-s-t-cut and MTU-s-t-cut (Trust s-t-cut) can output the optimal coalition structure in polynomial time. The results of simulated experiments show that the social utility increases with the number of agents, and the running time of the algorithms are far less than that of Dynamic Programming (DP) and Optimal Dynamic Programming and Integer Partition (ODP-IP) algorithms.
- Coalition structure generation,
- Trust utility relationship,
- Trust transitivity,
- Graph cut

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References(19)

References

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