A Lightweight Implementation Scheme of Data Encryption Standard with Cyclic Mask

Lihui WANG; Shouli YAN; Qing LI

doi:10.11999/JEIT190870

Volume 42 Issue 8

Aug. 2020

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2020 > 42(8): 1828-1835

Lihui WANG, Shouli YAN, Qing LI. A Lightweight Implementation Scheme of Data Encryption Standard with Cyclic Mask[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2020, 42(8): 1828-1835. doi: 10.11999/JEIT190870

Citation:

Lihui WANG, Shouli YAN, Qing LI. A Lightweight Implementation Scheme of Data Encryption Standard with Cyclic Mask[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2020, 42(8): 1828-1835. doi: 10.11999/JEIT190870

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A Lightweight Implementation Scheme of Data Encryption Standard with Cyclic Mask

doi: 10.11999/JEIT190870

Lihui WANG²,
Shouli YAN²,
Qing LI^{1, 2
,
,}

1.
State Key Laboratory of ASIC and System, Fudan University, Shanghai 201203, China
2.
Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Company Limited, Shanghai 200433, China

Funds: The 13th Five-Year Plan Advance Reserch Projects Fund of China (3110105-09)

Received Date: 2019-11-01
Rev Recd Date: 2020-06-06

Available Online: 2020-07-07

Publish Date: 2020-08-18

Abstract

Abstract

With the continuous development of smart card technology, the security of smart card chip is facing more and more challenges. Among many encryption algorithms, Data Encryption Standard(DES) algorithm is a widely used symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm. In order to resist all kinds of side channel attacks, the most widely used method is to eliminate correlation of the real key and power consumption through the masking technology in the algorithm. A new cyclic mask scheme for DES is proposed. Compared with the pre-calculated mask scheme in the previous literature, not only the pre-calculation amount is greatly reduced, but also the intermediate data in the whole DES operation process is masked. After the mask is split, it can also protect against high-order attacks.
- Data Encryption Standard(DES),
- Side channel attack,
- Mask

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References(23)

References

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