The Incentive Model for Mobile Crowd Sensing Oriented to Differences in Mission Costs

Jian WANG; Yue HUANG; Guosheng ZHAO; Zhongnan ZHAO

doi:10.11999/JEIT180640

Volume 41 Issue 6

Jun. 2019

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Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2019 > 41(6): 1503-1509

Jian WANG, Yue HUANG, Guosheng ZHAO, Zhongnan ZHAO. The Incentive Model for Mobile Crowd Sensing Oriented to Differences in Mission Costs[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(6): 1503-1509. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180640

Citation:

Jian WANG, Yue HUANG, Guosheng ZHAO, Zhongnan ZHAO. The Incentive Model for Mobile Crowd Sensing Oriented to Differences in Mission Costs[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(6): 1503-1509. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180640

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The Incentive Model for Mobile Crowd Sensing Oriented to Differences in Mission Costs

doi: 10.11999/JEIT180640

1.
School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150080, China
2.
School of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Harbin Normal University, Harbin 150025, China

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61403109, 61202458), The Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (20112303120007), The Heilongjiang Province Natural Science Foundation (F2017021), The Scientific Research Fund of Heilongjiang Province Educational Committee (12541169), The Specialized Research Fund for Scientific and Technological Innovation Talents of Harbin (2016RAQXJ036)

Received Date: 2018-07-02
Rev Recd Date: 2018-12-18

Available Online: 2019-01-02

Publish Date: 2019-06-01

Abstract

Abstract

To solve the problem of insufficient number of participants and poor data quality in the sensing mission, a mobile crowd sensing incentive model for mission cost difference is proposed. First of all, the fuzzy reasoning method is used to analyze the impact of data quantity, environmental conditions and equipment consumption on mission cost, and the sensing mission is divided into different levels on the basis of cost difference. Meanwhile, the method is used to prepare a budget for the requester and give the participant an appropriate reward. Then, the sensing mission is assigned to more appropriate participants to complete the sensing mission and upload the sensing data through credibility assessment and participants’ preference. Finally, the sensing data uploaded by participants is evaluated, and the credibility of participants is updated. Besides, the participants are paid according to the cost level of perceived missions. The simulation experiments based on the real data set show that the model can recruit more users to participate in the sensing mission effectively and promote participants to upload high-quality sensing data by using the mutual influence between different modules.
- Mobile crowd sensing,
- Incentive scheme,
- Differences in mission costs,
- Reputation

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References(17)

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