Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays

Yingjian YAN; Min LIU; Zhaoyang QIU

doi:10.11999/JEIT180484

Volume 41 Issue 5

Apr. 2019

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Yingjian YAN, Min LIU, Zhaoyang QIU. Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484

Citation:

Yingjian YAN, Min LIU, Zhaoyang QIU. Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2019, 41(5): 1257-1264. doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484

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Design and Implementation of Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm for Coarse-grained Reconfigurable Arrays

doi: 10.11999/JEIT180484

The PLA’s Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

Received Date: 2018-05-21
Rev Recd Date: 2018-09-20

Available Online: 2018-10-22

Publish Date: 2019-05-01

Abstract

Abstract

Hardware Trojan horse detection has become a hot research topic in the field of chip security. Most existing detection algorithms are oriented to ASIC circuits and FPGA circuits, and rely on golden chips that are not infected with hardware Trojan horses, which are difficult to adapt to the coarse-grained reconfigurable array consisting of large-scale reconfigurable cells. Therefore, aiming at the structural characteristics of Coarse-grained reconfigurable cryptographic logical arrays, a hardware Trojan horse detection algorithm based on partitioned and multiple variants logic fingerprints is proposed. The algorithm divides the circuit into multiple regions, adopts the logical fingerprint feature as the identifier of the region, and realizes the hardware Trojan detection and diagnosis without golden chip by comparing the multiple variant logic fingerprints of the regions in both dimensions of space and time. Experimental results show that the proposed detection algorithm has high detection success rate and low misjudgment rate for hardware Trojan detection.
- Hardware Trojan detection,
- Coarse-grained reconfigurable cryptographic array,
- Logic fingerprints,
- Multiple variants

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References(16)

References

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