面向车联网的物理不可克隆函数驱动安全匿名认证协议

伍麟珺; 丁林

doi:10.11999/JEIT260606

面向车联网的物理不可克隆函数驱动安全匿名认证协议

doi: 10.11999/JEIT260606 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT260606

伍麟珺,
丁林^,

1.
湖南工程学院信息科学与工程学院湘潭 411104
2.
北京大学集成电路学院北京 100871

基金项目: 湖南省自然科学基金(2026JJ90049)，湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(25A0527)

详细信息

作者简介:
伍麟珺：女，讲师，研究方向为硬件安全、信息安全、智能通信

丁林：男，助理研究员，研究方向为硬件安全、密码芯片、隐私保护计算

通讯作者:
丁林　dinglin@pku.edu.cn

中图分类号: TN915.08
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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2026-05-14
- 修回日期: 2026-09-02
- 录用日期: 2026-09-14
- 网络出版日期: 2026-09-20

PUF-driven Secure Anonymous Authentication Protocol for Internet of Vehicles

WU Linjun,
DING Lin^,

1.
College of Information Science and Engineering, Hunan Institute of Engineering, Xiangtan 411104, China
2.
College of Integrated Circuits, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

Funds: Hunan Natural Science Foundation (2026JJ90049), Scientific Research Fund of Hunan Provincial Education Department (25A0527)

摘要

摘要: 车联网作为智能交通系统的重要组成部分，通过车车与车路信息交互提升交通运行效率，正逐步成为智慧城市建设的重要基础设施。车联网车辆通过周期性广播基本安全消息辅助协同感知与智能决策，但明文传输可能导致车辆身份和行驶轨迹泄露。针对现有匿名认证方案中计算与通信开销较高，以及长期密钥存储易受到物理提取和侧信道攻击等问题，该文提出一种面向车联网的物理不可克隆函数(PUF)驱动安全匿名认证协议。该协议利用集成电路制造过程中形成的随机工艺偏差构建设备相关硬件指纹，并基于PUF激励-响应机制生成会话密钥，结合激励信息构造和更新车辆伪名。该方案利用PUF固有的物理不可克隆特性增强认证安全性，并结合密码学机制实现无需片内存储长期敏感密钥的硬件辅助认证，从而降低物理提取和侧信道攻击导致的密钥泄漏风险。在Dolev–Yao攻击模型下，该文采用BAN逻辑、ProVerif形式化验证和非形式化方法对协议安全性进行分析。分析结果表明，所提方案能够抵御重放攻击、伪装攻击和中间人攻击，并满足匿名性、可追溯性以及协议层身份不可链接性等安全需求。性能分析结果表明，所提方案在保证多项安全功能的同时具有较低的计算与通信开销，适用于资源受限的车联网环境。
- 物理不可克隆函数 /
- 车联网 /
- 匿名认证 /
- 伪名机制 /
- 轻量级安全协议
Abstract: Objective In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), vehicles often transmit Basic Safety Messages through open wireless links to support road safety and traffic management. However, these messages may expose vehicle identities and travel information. Attackers may collect messages over time and associate them with the same vehicle. Therefore, vehicle authentication should protect both network security and user privacy. Many existing anonymous authentication schemes require complex cryptographic operations, resulting in high computation and communication costs for resource-constrained On-Board Units (OBUs). Some schemes also store long-term secret keys in vehicle devices, which may be exposed through physical extraction or side-channel attacks. A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) uses random process variations generated during chip fabrication to construct unique hardware features. It can generate device-related responses without directly storing secret keys. Based on this property, this paper proposes a PUF-driven secure anonymous authentication protocol for IoV. The proposed protocol aims to reduce the risk of long-term key storage, protect vehicle identities, and reduce authentication overhead for vehicles. Methods The proposed protocol adopts a response-Feedback-based Lightweight Anti-Machine-learning-attack PUF (FLAM-PUF) as the hardware root of trust. FLAM-PUF combines an Arbiter PUF (APUF) with a reconfigurable Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The PUF response is fed back to update the LFSR state, which hides the relationship between Challenge–Response Pairs (CRPs) and increases the difficulty of machine-learning modeling attacks (Fig. 1). The system consists of a Center Management (CM), Local Management (LM) entities, Roadside Units (RSUs), and vehicle On-Board Units (OBUs) (Fig. 2). During initialization, reliable CRPs are collected in a trusted environment and transmitted to the CM through a secure channel. The main protocol parameters are listed in Table 1. A PUF challenge is used to generate a vehicle pseudonym, while the corresponding PUF response is used as authentication parameters and session key data. The OBU can recover the required PUF response from its local PUF when needed, eliminating the need to store long-term secret keys. The initialization process is shown in Fig. 3. The protocol adopts two types of pseudonyms. Long-term pseudonyms are used for network access and identity management, while temporary pseudonyms are used for communication within an LM area. The local access process is shown in Fig. 4. Temporary pseudonyms and session keys are updated using unused CRPs (Fig. 5), and long-term pseudonyms are renewed before expiration (Fig. 6). Security is analyzed under the Dolev–Yao model using Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic, ProVerif formal verification, and informal security analysis. Results and Discussions The proposed protocol combines PUF-based key generation with dynamic pseudonym management. First, FLAM-PUF uses response feedback and a reconfigurable LFSR to hide the internal CRP relationship, increasing the difficulty of machine-learning modeling attacks (Fig. 1). Second, the use of long-term and temporary pseudonyms separates network access from local vehicle communication. CRPs, pseudonyms, and session keys are updated synchronously, reducing the possibility that attackers associate vehicle identities across different authentication periods (Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6). BAN logic analysis shows that the vehicle can verify the binding between the temporary pseudonym and the PUF-based session key, while the LM can verify that this binding is authorized by the CM. ProVerif verification results show that the secrecy queries for vehicle identities and PUF responses are satisfied, and all three injective authentication correspondences hold. Under the assumed freshness and one-time CRP usage conditions, the results support the protocol's resistance to replay and impersonation attacks. Informal security analysis demonstrates that the protocol provides mutual authentication, anonymity, traceability, revocability, and protocol-level identity unlinkability. It also resists replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and false message attacks (Table 3). In addition, the OBU does not need to store long-term secret keys in nonvolatile memory because the required PUF responses can be recovered when needed, reducing the risk of direct key extraction. For performance evaluation, the execution times of the main cryptographic operations are measured (Table 4), and the computation costs of the OBU, CM, and LM at each protocol stage are summarized in Table 5. For one complete online authentication and session key agreement process, the computation time of the proposed scheme on the OBU is approximately 1 365.99 ms, and the communication cost is 992 bits (Table 6). Under the same evaluation conditions, its computation time is close to that of Ref. [14] and lower than those of Refs. [15]–[17]. Its communication cost is lower than those of all four compared schemes. These results demonstrate that the proposed protocol provides more security functions while maintaining low vehicle-side costs. Conclusions This paper proposes a PUF-driven secure anonymous authentication protocol for IoV. FLAM-PUF is used as a hardware root of trust to recover authentication parameters and session key data when needed, avoiding direct storage of long-term secret keys in OBUs. The combination of long-term and temporary pseudonyms supports anonymous access, identity tracing, revocation, and protocol-level identity unlinkability. BAN logic, ProVerif formal verification, and informal security analysis show that the proposed protocol satisfies its main security requirements and resists common network attacks. Performance evaluation results show that one online authentication and session key agreement process requires approximately 1 365.99 ms of OBU computation and 992 bits of communication (Table 6). The proposed protocol achieves a balance among security, privacy protection, and low computational cost, making it suitable for resource-constrained IoV devices.
- Physical Unclonable Function(PUF) /
- Internet of Vehicles (IoV) /
- Anonymous authentication /
- Pseudonym mechanism /
- Lightweight security protocol

HTML全文

图 1 FLAM-PUF结构和响应反馈流程

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图 2 车辆伪名管理分发机制系统架构图

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图 3 初始化时序图

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图 4 本地入网认证时序图

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图 5 临时伪名更新时序图

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图 6 长期伪名更新时序图

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表 1 伪名管理方案参数表

符号	描述	符号	描述
V_h	第h辆车	PK_c	中心管理局CM公钥
CM	中心管理局	SK_c	中心管理局CM私钥
LM_i	第i个本地管理局	CRP	PUF的激励响应对集合
RSU	路侧单元	crp_x	第x个激励响应对
rid	车辆全网唯一永久标识	ch_x	crp_x的激励
lid	车辆长期伪名	res_x	crp_x的响应
pid	车辆临时伪名	Enckey{}	以key为密钥的加密操作
K_ch	车辆V_h与中心管理局CM之间基于PUF响应建立的认证密钥	Deckey{}	以key为密钥的解密操作
K_ih	车辆V_h与本地管理局LM_i之间的共享会话密钥	stamp	时间戳
LPK	本地管理局LM公钥	r	随机数
LSK	本地管理局LM私钥	time	伪名或者密钥使用有效期

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表 2 ProVerif安全查询及验证结果

验证目标	ProVerif查询/对应关系	验证结果
永久身份机密性	query attacker(rid)	成立
当前PUF响应及认证密钥机密性	query attacker(res1)	成立
新PUF响应及会话密钥机密性	query attacker(res2)	成立
CM对车辆的认证	CM接受$\Rightarrow $车辆发起	注入对应关系成立
车辆对CM的认证	车辆接受$\Rightarrow $CM生成M₂	注入对应关系成立
LM_i对CM的认证	LM接受$\Rightarrow $CM生成并签署M₃	注入对应关系成立

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表 3 认证方案安全属性比较

安全属性	文献[14]	文献[15]	文献[16]	文献[17]	本文
双向认证	√	×	×	√	√
匿名性	√	√	√	√	√
可追溯性	√	√	×	×	√
可撤销性	√	√	×	×	√
身份不可链接性	√	√	√	×	√
抗伪装攻击	√	√	√	√	√
抗重放攻击	√	√	√	√	√
抗中间人攻击	√	√	√	√	√
虚假消息攻击	√	√	√	√	√
无需长期存储密钥(认证参数)	×	×	×	×	√
抗建模攻击	×	×	√	√	√
注释：“√”表示具备相应安全属性或功能，“×”表示不具备相应安全属性或功能。

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表 4 密码学操作运行时间

符号	定义	运行时间(μs)	符号	定义	运行时间(μs)
T_P	物理不可克隆函数(PUF)	682	T_AD	非对称解密	25282
T_h	哈希函数	0.172	T_EM	椭圆曲线点乘	1996
T_E	对称加密	0.947	T_EA	椭圆曲线点加	85.486
T_D	对称解密	0.699	T_X	按位异或	9.38
T_Sig	RSA数字签名生成	2183.71	T_Ver	RSA数字签名验证	410.09
T_AE	非对称加密	27122	TF	模糊提取	493.63

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表 5 各阶段各实体计算运行情况

认证阶段	计算实体	计算开销
本地入网请求	车辆OBU	2T_P+2T_h+T_E+T_D
	中心管理局CM	2T_h+2T_E+T_D+3T_AE+T_Sig
	本地管理局LM	3T_AD+T_Ver
临时伪名更新	车辆OBU	T_P+T_D+T_h
	中心管理局CM	T_Ver+T_h+T_E+T_AE+T_Sig
	本地管理局LM	T_Ver+T_AE+T_Sig
长期伪名更新	车辆OBU	2T_P+2T_h+T_E+T_D
长期伪名更新	中心管理局CM	2T_h+T_E+T_D

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表 6 OBU侧计算时延开销与通信开销比较

安全协议方案	OBU认证计算时延开销(μs)	OBU认证通信开销bit
[14]	2T_P +5T_X+5T_h≈1411.76	1088
[15]	2T_EM+3T_h+T_E+T_D≈3994.16	1664
[16]	6T_EM+2T_EA+6T_h+T_X+T_P+T_F≈13333.01	3584
[17]	2T_P+3T_h+T_F+T_E≈1859.09	1008
本文	2T_P+2T_h+T_E+T_D≈1365.99	992
注：表中开销均按车辆OBU完成1次在线认证与会话密钥协商统计；计算时延仅计OBU侧密码学操作，通信开销为OBU发送与接收的认证消息总长度，不含注册阶段、其他实体计算及认证后的业务数据。

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