Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation

ZHANG Yueyu; XU Dong; CHEN Jie

doi:10.11999/JEIT210556

Volume 44 Issue 8

Aug. 2022

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Electronics & Information Technology > 2022 > 44(8): 2903-2913

ZHANG Yueyu, XU Dong, CHEN Jie. Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2022, 44(8): 2903-2913. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210556

Citation:

ZHANG Yueyu, XU Dong, CHEN Jie. Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2022, 44(8): 2903-2913. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210556

ZHANG Yueyu, XU Dong, CHEN Jie. Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2022, 44(8): 2903-2913. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210556

Citation:

ZHANG Yueyu, XU Dong, CHEN Jie. Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation[J]. Journal of Electronics & Information Technology, 2022, 44(8): 2903-2913. doi: 10.11999/JEIT210556

PDF( 3990 KB)

Analysis and Improvement of White-box SM4 Implementation

doi: 10.11999/JEIT210556

ZHANG Yueyu¹,
XU Dong¹,
CHEN Jie^{2, 3
,
,}

1.
School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China
2.
Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security, Guilin 541004, China
3.
China State Key Laboratory of ISN, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071, China

Funds: The National Cryptography Development Fund of China (MMJJ20180219), The Natural Science Basic Research Program of Shaanxi Province (2021JM-126), Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (GCIS202125)

Received Date: 2021-06-10
Rev Recd Date: 2021-09-20

Available Online: 2021-09-29

Publish Date: 2022-08-17

Abstract

Abstract

Differential Computational Analysis (DCA) is a side channel analysis method applied to white box security analysis. Its efficiency has been verified in the analysis of white-box Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). A new DCA-like attack is proposed named Intermediate-Values Mean Difference Analysis(IVMDA). The analysis takes the results of the lookup table in the white-box SM4 implementation as the analysis object, and uses the method of statistical analysis to extract the key. Compared with the existing white-box SM4 analysis method, the intermediate-values mean difference analysis requires fewer conditions, and the analysis efficiency is higher. After successfully analyzing the white-box SM4 implementation, a software countermeasure is proposed to improve its security. The software countermeasure uses nonlinear components to confuse the intermediate state in the white-box implementation and eliminate the correlation between the intermediate state and the key. The experimental results show that the countermeasure can effectively resist the intermediate-values mean difference analysis.
- White-box implementation,
- SM4 algorithm,
- Differential Computational Analysis(DCA),
- Software countermeasure

FullText(HTML)

References(26)

References

[1]	CHOW S, EISEN P, JOHNSON H, et al. White-box cryptography and an AES implementation[C]. The 9th International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Newfoundland, Canada, 2002: 250–270. doi: 10.1007/3-540-36492-7_17.
[2]	CHOW S, EISEN P, JOHNSON H, et al. A white-box DES implementation for DRM applications[C]. ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, Washington, USA, 2002: 1–15. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-44993-5_1.
[3]	BILLET O, GILBERT H, and ECH-CHATBI C. Cryptanalysis of a white box AES implementation[C]. International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Waterloo, Canada, 2004: 227–240. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_16.
[4]	MICHIELS W, GORISSEN P, and HOLLMANN H D L. Cryptanalysis of a generic class of white-box implementations[C]. 15th International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Sackville, Canada, 2008: 414–428. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-04159-4_27.
[5]	BOS J W, HUBAIN C, MICHIELS W, et al. Differential computation analysis: Hiding your white-box designs is not enough[C]. The 18th International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Santa Barbara, Canada, 2016: 215–236. doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_11.
[6]	KOCHER P, JAFFE J, JUN B, et al. Introduction to differential power analysis[J]. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2011, 1(1): 5–27. doi: 10.1007/s13389-011-0006-y
[7]	BIRYUKOV A and UDOVENKO A. Attacks and countermeasures for white-box designs[C]. The 24th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Brisbane, Australia, 2018: 373–402. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-03329-3_13.
[8]	BOCK E A, BRZUSKA C, MICHIELS W, et al. On the ineffectiveness of internal encodings - revisiting the DCA attack on white-box cryptography[C]. The 16th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, Leuven, Belgium, 2018: 103–120. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_6.
[9]	BREUNESSE C B, KIZHVATOV I, MUIJRERS R, et al. Towards fully automated analysis of whiteboxes: Perfect dimensionality reduction for perfect leakage[EB/OL]. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/095, 2018.
[10]	RIVAIN M and WANG Junwei. Analysis and improvement of differential computation attacks against internally-encoded white-box implementations[J]. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2019, 2019(2): 225–255. doi: 10.13154/tches.v2019.i2.225-255
[11]	BOGDANOV A, RIVAIN M, VEJRE P S, et al. Higher-order DCA against standard side-channel countermeasures[C]. The 10th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Darmstadt, Germany, 2019: 118–141. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-16350-1_8.
[12]	LEE S, KIM T, and KANG Y. A masked white-box cryptographic implementation for protecting against differential computation analysis[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2018, 13(10): 2602–2615. doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2825939
[13]	BANIK S, BOGDANOV A, ISOBE T, et al. Analysis of software countermeasures for whitebox encryption[J]. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017, 2017(1): 307–328. doi: 10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.307-328
[14]	LEE S and KIM M. Improvement on a masked white-box cryptographic implementation[J]. IEEE Access, 2020, 8: 90992–91004. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2993651
[15]	中华人民共和国国家质量监督检验检疫总局, 中国国家标准化管理委员会. GB/T 32907-2016 信息安全技术 SM4分组密码算法[S]. 北京: 中国标准出版社, 2006. General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China, Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China. GB/T 32907-2016 Information security technology—SM4 block cipher algorithm[S]. Beijing: Standards Press of China, 2016.
[16]	肖雅莹, 来学嘉. 白盒密码及SMS4算法的白盒实现[C]. 中国密码学会2009年会论文集, 广州, 2009: 24−34. XIAO Yaying and LAI Xuejia. White-Box cryptography and implementations of SMS4[C]. Proc. of the 2009 CACR Annual Meeting, Guangzhou, China, 2009: 24−34.
[17]	林婷婷, 来学嘉. 对白盒SMS4实现的一种有效攻击[J]. 软件学报, 2013, 24(9): 2238–2249. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1001.2013.04356 LIN Tingting and LAI Xuejia. Efficient attack to white-box SMS4 implementation[J]. Journal of Software, 2013, 24(9): 2238–2249. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1001.2013.04356
[18]	SHI Yang, WEI Wujing, and HE Zongjian. A lightweight white-box symmetric encryption algorithm against node capture for WSNs[J]. Sensors, 2015, 15(5): 11928–11952. doi: 10.3390/s150511928
[19]	BAI Kunpeng and WU Chuankun. A secure white-box SM4 implementation[J]. Security and Communication Networks, 2016, 9(10): 996–1006. doi: 10.1002/sec.1394
[20]	潘文伦, 秦体红, 贾音, 等. 对两个SM4白盒方案的分析[J]. 密码学报, 2018, 5(6): 651–670. doi: 10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000274 PAN Wenlun, QIN Tihong, JIA Yin, et al. Cryptanalysis of two white-box SM4 implementations[J]. Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2018, 5(6): 651–670. doi: 10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000274
[21]	姚思, 陈杰. SM4算法的一种新型白盒实现[J]. 密码学报, 2020, 7(3): 358–374. doi: 10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000373 YAO Si and CHEN Jie. A new method for white-box implementation of SM4 algorithm[J]. Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2020, 7(3): 358–374. doi: 10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000373
[22]	AHN H and HAN D G. Multilateral white-box cryptanalysis: Case study on WB-AES of CHES challenge 2016[EB/OL]. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/807, 2016.
[23]	BOCK E A, BOS J W, BRZUSKA C, et al. White-box cryptography: Don’t forget about grey-box attacks[J]. Journal of Cryptology, 2019, 32(4): 1095–1143. doi: 10.1007/s00145-019-09315-1
[24]	LUK C K, COHN R, MUTH R, et al. Pin: Building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation[J]. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 2005, 40(6): 190–200. doi: 10.1145/1064978.1065034
[25]	NETHERCOTE N and SEWARD J. Valgrind: A framework for heavyweight dynamic binary instrumentation[C]. The 28th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, San Diego, USA, 2007: 89–100. doi: 10.1145/1250734.1250746.
[26]	LUO Rui, LAI Xuejia, and YOU Rong. A new attempt of white-box AES implementation[C]. 2014 IEEE International Conference on Security, Pattern Analysis, and Cybernetics (SPAC), Wuhan, China, 2014: 423–429. doi: 10.1109/SPAC.2014.6982727.