Cryptanalysis of a Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
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摘要: 在2012年第15届国际公钥密码学(PKC)年会上,Fujioka等人利用密钥封装机制(KEM)提出了认证密钥交换(AKE)协议的一个通用构造,称为GC协议,并在CK+模型下证明了该协议的安全性。该文对GC协议进行了安全性分析,指出该协议是不安全的,难于抵抗不知道任何秘密信息的外部攻击者实施的假冒攻击,进一步分析了原协议安全性证明中被疏忽之处。Abstract: In the 15th (2012) IACR international conference on practice and theory of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC), Fujioka et al. proposed a generic construction of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) from a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which is called the GC protocol and is proven to be secure in the CK+ security model. In this paper, it is pointed out by cryptanalysis that the GC protocol is not CK+ secure. Concrete attacks in which the outside adversary, without knowing the static or ephemeral keys of the users, imitates a valid user are also given. Further, the errors in the original security proof are analyzed.
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Key words:
- Cryptography /
- Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) /
- Provable security /
- Imitate attack
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